3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
declaration
alternative. Saddam was intelligent and well advised; he could be
coached
into
providing a difficult answer.”
518.
In response to
a question from Sir Jeremy Greenstock about whether the US
was
genuine
about the UN approach or whether it was “a brief effort before the
early use
of force”,
with the status of inspectors the key difference between the two
approaches,
Secretary
Powell said that President Bush was not doing this as a fig leaf
for war: the
US could
not act unilaterally; it needed too much help in the region.
Secretary Powell
added that
the US needed more than resolution 1284 (1999). If the UN approach
worked
and regime
change “dropped away”, the US would need a really tough inspection
regime
(“Blix plus
plus”), not a weak UNSCOM.
519.
Mr Straw
gave an account of Sir David Manning’s telephone conversation
with
Dr Rice
earlier that day, which Secretary Powell summed up as the UK saying
that the
US can’t
say “we don’t like the answer [to our declaration demand], we’re
going to war”.
Secretary
Powell advised that Mr Blair might need to make the importance
he attached
to the
return of inspectors clear to President Bush.
520.
Mr Straw
sent Mr Blair a separate minute reporting the conversation
and
“recommend[ing]
strongly” that Mr Blair should speak to President Bush after
his
speech “to
secure a reconfirmation” of what he had agreed at Camp
David.157
Mr Straw
suggested
that Mr Blair should also “dismiss” any idea of simply giving
Iraq 15‑30 days
to explain
the discrepancies the inspectors had unearthed then moving to
military action
rather than
seeking the insertion of inspectors.
521.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that Mr Blair thought President Bush
should
use his
speech at the UN General Assembly to make a virtue of going
the
UN route.
522.
Sir David
Manning spoke again to Dr Rice at 12.15pm on 11
September.158
He suggested
that President Bush’s speech needed to expand his concluding
sentence
on the role
of the UN by announcing he would be proposing a new resolution
“within
the next
few days”. That would have “immediate impact at the UN and great
resonance
in Europe
and more widely. At present the speech left us hanging.” It was “at
best, only
implicit”
what President Bush thought the UN should do.
523.
In response to
a question from Dr Rice, Sir David told her he was
“confident” that
was
Mr Blair’s view. The President should use the speech to make a
virtue of going the
UN
route.
524.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that President Bush “would probably be ready to
do this”
for Mr Blair.
157
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 10 September 2002, ‘US/Iraq’.
158
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
181