The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

717.  The Annotated Agenda for the 12 June meeting of the AHMGIR advised that

security in the South remained fragile.402 Iraqi frustration with the pace of progress

could cause the situation to deteriorate. The UK’s ability to “push the pace” would be

constrained by the reduction in UK military force strength following the transition to

3rd (UK) Mechanised Division in July.

718.  The Annotated Agenda also stated that the UK AO would expand to four provinces

at the end of July, to match the area of CPA(South), and that substantial Italian and

Dutch military forces were expected over the next four to six weeks.

719.  The meeting of the AHMGIR on 12 June also considered a joint DFID/MOD paper

entitled ‘UK Support to the CPA South Area – Next Steps’. The paper assessed that:

“CPA(South) is unable to deliver in terms of determining priority needs, overseeing

implementation, or supporting the political transition. There is a lack of vision;

CPA(South) is severely undermanned; and has almost no systems or resources in

place to deliver any tangible improvements soon. In consequence, 1 (UK) Div retains

almost all executive authority in the UK area of operations (AO). In turn, locals look

to the British military, not CPA(South), to address local problems. To the extent that

these functions are being carried out at present, it is due to the unstinting efforts

of 1 (UK) Div, the few UK secondees in the South, and, more importantly, the high

quality of the Iraqi counterparts they are working with.”

720.  At the meeting, Ministers noted that it had been decided that the UK area of

military operations would be expanded to cover four provinces (Muthanna, Dhi Qar,

Maysan and Basra), to match the area of CPA(South).403

721.  Mr Straw, as Chair of the AHMGIR, the body responsible for determining

UK policy on post-conflict Iraq, should have ensured well before June that the

AHMGIR agreed a position on the UK’s AOR in Iraq that took full account of wider

strategic implications and contingent liabilities, and sought Mr Blair’s formal

endorsement of the AHMGIR’s conclusions. There is no indication that he did so.

722.  MND(SE) was established formally on 12 July.404 Its creation coincided with the

handover from 1 (UK) Div to 3 (UK) Div.

723.  The boundaries of MND(SE) matched those of CPA(South).

402 Annotated Agenda, 12 June 2003 Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting attaching

Paper DFID/MOD, 11 June 2003, ‘UK Support to the CPA South Area – Next Steps’.

403  Minutes, 12 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

404  Report Lamb, 30 January 2004, ‘Post Operational Tour Report – Version 1 Operation TELIC 2/3 11 July

to 28 December 2003’.

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