The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
204.
The Iraq
Secretariat recommended that the MOD wait to see the outcome of
the
latest
FCO/DFID recruitment drive, but also stand ready to provide what
assistance
it could
if that was unsuccessful. Numbers were unlikely to be large (“10s
of people”).
The Iraq
Secretariat stated that an effective CPA(South) was crucial to UK
success in
the South:
“If other
avenues have been exhausted it may thus
be in our interest to seek
Reservists
to fill requirements.”
205.
UK policy on
the deployment of Reservists in civilian roles is addressed
in
Section
10.3.
206.
CPA(South)
moved from the former Electricity Accounts building in Basra to
the
Basra
Palace site on 15 October.142
Sir Hilary
Synnott wrote in his memoir:
“It was
security which had driven the move and which had ensured that it
happened
quickly,
but it was the improved comfort which everyone appreciated the
most.
“The
difference in living conditions seemed almost unbelievable. Instead
of
sleeping in
crowded rooms or on floors, with unspeakable sanitary
arrangements
and
virtually non‑existent communications equipment, every staff member
had their
own cabin …
with a proper bed, a cupboard, a shower and lavatory, and even
an
air‑conditioning
unit …
“Within
another couple of weeks FCO engineers had installed a
secure
communications
system …
…
“At last,
two‑and‑a‑half months after my arrival, I was starting to muster
the staff and
equipment
which would enable me to do my job reasonably effectively. This
support
was as
nothing compared with the general’s [Major General Graeme Lamb,
General
Officer
Commanding (GOC) MND(SE)] staff, but it was something; and, of
course,
our
respective tasks were different.”
207.
By late
October, Sir Hilary Synnott had received none of the
additional staff
he had
requested in late August.143
On 27
October, he sent a further request to the
FCO.144
He
explained that his initial request for 37 staff had focused on “our
top
priority
areas: infrastructure, finance, police and security”. It was now
clear to him that
44 more
staff were needed to cover “political reporting, governance issues
and CPA(S)
internal
support”.
“I also
urgently need assurance that arrangements are in hand for the
succession
of those UK
staff currently in mission. The relatively rapid turnaround of
staff makes
142
Synnott
H. Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. I B
Tauris & Co
Ltd.,
2008.
143
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 45.
144
Telegram 38
Basra to FCO London, 27 October 2003, ‘CPA(South): Staffing
Requirements’.
278