The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
was
compiling a list of explicit questions about outstanding issues to
“pin the
Iraqis
down”;
•
was looking
at establishing a No-Fly Zone for the whole of Iraq;
and
•
was looking
at freezing movements in certain areas to improve the
chances
of catching
a mobile “bio-lab”.122
463.
Dr Blix
recorded that he told both Mr Straw and Secretary Powell about
the
document
being prepared by UNMOVIC, as required by resolution 1284 (1999),
which
“contained
‘clusters’ of unresolved issues and indicated precisely what was
required of
Iraq” that
could be used “as a basis for selecting key disarmament tasks for
the work
programme”
in a “‘benchmark’ approach”.123
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell were both
“most
interested” in the idea.
464.
Dr Blix
discussed the idea with both Dr Rice and Secretary Powell over
the next
two days.
When he asked whether a deadline of 15 April was acceptable,
Secretary
Powell said
that was too late.
465.
Dr Blix
also wrote that there was a lack of smoking guns that would impress
the
public; and
that the British “who were most fervently in favour of a resolution
embodying
an
ultimatum” had felt the resistance stiffen and “came to think that
a change of focus
might help.
The new resolution could demand a declaration by Saddam showing
that
he had
had a change of heart.”
466.
Mr Straw
and Sir David Manning agreed with Secretary Powell and
Dr Rice
that, over
the next few days, the US and UK should reflect on what the next
steps
should
be.
467.
Sir David
Manning suggested that military action should not start
before
late March.
468.
Discussing the
next steps with Secretary Powell after the Council
discussion,
Mr Straw
raised the possibility of issuing an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
and
expressed
caution on the timing of a second resolution. The US and UK had
been
on the back
foot all day and needed to be clear about how they intended to play
the
end game
before it began.124
469.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice agreed on 14 February to reflect over the
next two
to three
days on what the next move at the UN should be, including an
ultimatum.125
Stressing
that he was speaking personally, Sir David suggested that one
possibility
122
Telegram 89
FCO London to UKMIS New York, 15 February 2003, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with Executive
Chairman of UNMOVIC, New York, 14 February’.
123
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing
Plc, 2005.
124
Telegram
269 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with Powell:
14 February’.
125
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
264