The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The reports
contained sporadic instances of non-co-operation; but the
question
was whether
that was “recurring, systematic non-co-operation” and if it
indicated
“a real
pattern of unwillingness to comply” or “isolated instances of
differences”.
•
Egypt was
opposed in principle to additional sanctions.
•
The Council
should have mandated the UN Sanctions Committee to
determine
clear
criteria for the modalities for the implementation of the
resolution so that
the Council
could “avoid contributing to aggravating the tensions between
Iraq
and the
Special Commission, which could complicate the task of
eliminating
weapons of
mass destruction”.
366.
Mr Elaraby
concluded by stating that Egypt had asked for more time for “calm
and
constructive
dialogue”, but the sponsors of the resolution:
“… had
insisted on it being put to the vote … without taking into account
the majority
of the
proposals put forward in recent days … so that the draft resolution
would
respect
logic, legality and the provisions of resolution 1115 … and …
inspire the Iraqi
Government
to co-operate more fully with the Special Commission.”
367.
Mr Kipkorir
Aly Azad Rana, Kenyan Deputy Permanent Representative to the
UN,
stated that
he would abstain because the draft resolution did not “clearly
portray the
balance and
tone of the reports” from the IAEA and UNSCOM.
368.
Mr Liu
Jieyi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of China to the UN, stated
that the
priority
should be to enhance the co-operation between Iraq and UNSCOM and
that he
would
abstain because the draft resolution was “not conducive to the
settlement of the
problems
concerned” and amendments proposed by “quite a number of
delegations”
had not
been accepted.
369.
Mr Lavrov
stated that the IAEA and UNSCOM had recently produced
“voluminous
comprehensive
reports on the significant work done on filling in the blank spaces
in the
Iraq
disarmament dossier”. The UNSCOM report had noted “significant” and
“important”
progress,
particularly in the missile and chemical areas, and the IAEA report
“had
a positive
tone”. Iraq had not accounted for all the items proscribed by
section C of
resolution
687, and a number of questions remained “to be clarified in the
biological
sphere”.
There were “deficiencies” in Iraq’s compliance and “isolated
incidents”, but
that could
not “justify the immediate adoption of additional sanctions”. The
problems
should be
addressed within the framework of planned consultations between
Mr Butler
and Baghdad.
370.
Mr Lavrov
added that there was “an obvious lack of balance” in the draft
resolution
which
“Ignored … various substantial elements of the fulfilment by Iraq
of relevant
provisions
of resolution 687”.
90