The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
making sure
the UN and IEC had robust plans in place; and
•
ensuring
the best possible security conditions.207
392.
The Cabinet
Office described a JIC paper on Iraqiisation issued on 15
December
as “grim”.
It described “high levels of dependency on the MNF-I until 2006”,
“serious
structural
weaknesses within the ISF” and “an assistance programme that, while
making
progress,
will take considerably more time to deliver significant impact”. By
contrast,
the MOD’s
paper had suggested that the Petraeus Plan would deliver, given
time.
(See Section
12 for more detail.)
393.
Mr Straw
briefed the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq that they should
expect
the
elections to be far from perfect but that, if there were problems
during the election
period, it
would be important to remind critics that these were the first
democratic
elections
in Iraq for many years and that on this occasion the Iraqi people
were only
electing a
transitional assembly.208
394.
The Chief of
the Assessments Staff told the meeting that the ISF would
“face
a major
challenge in handling the elections”.
395.
Mr Hoon
explained that a battalion was on stand-by in Cyprus in case it
was
required
during the election period. If the UK wanted to have the
flexibility to deploy
it during
the election period, its “notice to move” needed to be reduced from
five to
three days
by 1 January.
396.
Mr Asquith
wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary following a visit to Iraq in
mid
December.209
He
commented:
“The time
had now passed to argue for a delay in the polling day … Focusing
on
30 January
was the likeliest way to bring in the Sunni Arabs. When confronted
with
reality,
they would not repeat the mistake of the Shia in the
1920s.”
397.
The key issues
for the UK in the weeks ahead were to:
•
manage
expectations for the elections; and
•
build IECI
capability to enable it to deliver the January elections,
the
constitutional
referendum and the elections in December 2005, which
could
require
“redrawing of boundaries, a new electoral law and a
census”.
398.
Mr Asquith
considered that priorities for 2005 included:
•
to make
sure that the new Constitution reflected the voice of all the
communities
in Iraq;
207
Paper
Cabinet Office, 15 December 2004, ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting to be held in
the Cabinet
Room on Thursday 16 December 2004 at 11:00 – Chairman’s
Brief’.
208
Minutes, 16
December 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
209
Minute
Asquith to Owen, 20 December 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq, 13-17
December’.
458