The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
54.
The deaths of
10 members of the Hamoudi family in a Coalition air strike on
houses
in a
residential area of Basra in early April 2003 attracted significant
media attention.
55.
The Inquiry
has considered, as a case study, the Government’s role in
and
response to
the air strike.
56.
The UK
military undertook a Rapid Collateral Damage Assessment on 4 April
2003
for a
possible attack on a small group of residential houses in Basra
that were expected
to be
visited by General Ali Hasan Al‑Majid (also known as Chemical
Ali).44
Gen
Al‑Majid
was described as responsible for co‑ordinating resistance to the
Coalition within
southern
Iraq and therefore as a combatant.45
57.
The Assessment
concluded that seven houses (not including those targeted)
might
suffer
collateral damage, and that there would be additional casualties in
the open,
resulting
in 39 civilian casualties in a day attack and 51 in a night attack
(again, not
including
casualties in the targeted houses).46
No separate
estimate had been made of
damage to
or casualties in the targeted buildings.
58.
Given the
number of expected civilian casualties (more than 30),
approval
for
the attack was referred from HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division to
Air Marshal
(AM) Brian Burridge,
the UK’s National Contingent Commander, and hence to
59.
AM Burridge
advised Mr Hoon that:
“… the
expected civilian casualties … would not be excessive in relation
to the
direct and
concrete military advantage anticipated should Al‑Majid be
successfully
targeted.
The attack is therefore capable of being assessed as proportional
by the
60.
On 4 April,
Mr Hoon agreed that the attack should proceed.49
However, Gen
Al‑Majid
was
reported to have left the location before the attack could be
carried out.
61.
In the
expectation of Gen Al‑Majid’s return, AM Burridge also sought
approval for the
44
Minute NCHQ
OA to NCHQ J3 Targets, 4 April 2003, ‘Rapid Collateral Damage
Estimate Residential
Houses
(Loc: 303121.8N 474904.0E)’.
45
TST Log
Sheet, [undated], [untitled].
46
Minute NCHQ
OA to NCHQ J3 Targets, 4 April 2003, ‘Rapid Collateral Damage
Estimate Residential
Houses
(Loc: 303121.8N 474904.0E)’.
47
Minute BMRA
to NC HQ, 15 April 2003, ‘Civilian Casualties – Coalition
Engagement in Basrah –
05 April 2003’;
Minute HQ NCC to PJHQ, 16 April 2003, ‘Time Sensitive Target – Gen
Ali Hasan Al Majid’.
48
TST Log
Sheet, [undated], [untitled].
49
Minute HQ
NCC to PJHQ, 16 April 2003, ‘Time Sensitive Target – Gen Ali Hasan
Al Majid’.
50
Minute HQ
NCC to PJHQ, 16 April 2003, ‘Time Sensitive Target – Gen Ali Hasan
Al Majid’.
182