6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
750.
Lord Goldsmith
said that in relation to the “three ‘dramatic’ targets”, Mr Hoon
would
need to be
satisfied that there was “sufficient evidence to justify the
conclusion that they
actively
participate in military command and control”. It was not enough “to
assess that
a person is
likely, if certain circumstances occur, to take over military
command and
control”.
Article 51(3) AP1 did not allow for the pre-emptive targeting of
civilians.
751.
Second, having
established that an individual was a legitimate target, Mr
Hoon
should
consider “the question of proportionality”.
752.
The
proportionality assessment would need to be considered at the time
an attack
was
authorised, based on the place where the person was suspected to be
and having
regard to
IHL.
753.
Lord Goldsmith
had “no doubt” that AM Burridge would consider carefully
whether
any
proposed attack was proportionate:
“But given
the sensitivity of targeting individuals and the distinct
possibility that an
attack may
not succeed (either because the intelligence was wrong or
because
the
individual moved on before the strike took place), my advice is
that you should
consider
carefully the possibility of giving guidance to the commander on
how he
is to
assess proportionality in relation to these targets. You should
bear in mind in
this
context the delegation proposed in your letter would give Air
Marshal Burridge
authority
to authorise an attack on any of the three key individuals which
would
cause
unlimited civilian casualties, no matter where the individual was
located. So,
for
example, an attack on such an individual could be authorised
without reference
to
Ministers if intelligence suggested he were in a school, hospital,
mosque or
densely
populated residential area of Baghdad.”
754.
Lord Goldsmith
advised that there were a number of points to consider in
deciding
what
guidance Mr Hoon might give, including:
•
What was
“the concrete military advantage of killing each particular
individual?”
•
If Mr Hoon
was prepared to contemplate the delegation of authority with a
high
estimate of
casualties, was it feasible to place an upper limit on the
casualties
which might
be caused by an attack?
•
Since the
extent of the military advantage was likely to change as the
campaign
progressed,
it would be important to keep the delegation under constant
and
careful
review.
755.
Following
further exchanges with Lord Goldsmith, Mr Hoon replied on 7
April
confirming
the delegations to AM Burridge and that they would be kept
under
constant
review.
507