10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
711.
Treasury
officials advised Mr Brown on 5 September that pressure was
building
for
significant, additional UK contributions to reconstruction and
security in Iraq, both
from
international partners and from within Whitehall.393
That
pressure was generated
by emerging
reports on the substantial size of Iraq’s financing gap for 2004
(now
estimated
at between US$1bn and, according to new figures from the CPA,
US$20bn)
and
Mr Blair’s emphasis on the need to deliver tangible and rapid
progress through both
additional
military resources and reconstruction.
712.
Treasury
officials advised that DFID were developing a case for a
substantial UK
contribution
to meeting the financing gap, which could be announced at the
forthcoming
Madrid
Donors Conference. The US had approached the FCO to ascertain the
UK’s
position on
additional financing for reconstruction, and discussions were
beginning
between
international development ministries.
713.
Treasury
officials commented:
“There is a
growing and costly perception in Whitehall (and potentially parts
of the
CPA and the
US Administration) that if the UK wants to pull its weight, it
should cover
10% of all
costs … In purely fiscal terms we cannot afford a contribution of
this size
without a
very substantial re-prioritisation of existing spending allocations
…
“ … [Sir]
Jeremy Greenstock, UK Special Representative in Iraq [sic], has
hinted
that if we
want to influence the outcome in Iraq and in particular the
decision-making
process at
the centre of the CPA, we have to buy our way in. We refute this.
Our
military
contribution was crucial to the success of the initial operation …
and our
ability to
influence through political leverage should not be diminished
significantly.
“The main
cause of agitation in the South, and in turn pressure on the UK
to
increase
troop levels and to contribute additional resources, is the fact
that
resources
are not arriving quick enough from CPA(Centre) to CPA(South).
There
is a danger
that this is because the US controls CPA(Centre) and are
allocating
resources
to their priority areas and are squeezing the areas where they
perceive
the UK to
lead. This backs up the view that we do not have enough influence
in
CPA(Centre).”
714.
Treasury
officials also advised that they were increasingly concerned over
the
lack of a
“comprehensive, long-term strategy” for Iraq, which led to
continued ad hoc
spending.
DFID’s recent decision to provide £20m to fund the Essential
Services Plan
was an
example of this. The decision left the UK exposed to providing
further funding if
CPA
resources remained inaccessible and/or costs escalated. The UK
should continue
to push for
CPA(Baghdad) to mobilise resources for use in the South rather than
taking
on more of
the burden itself.
393
Minute
Treasury [junior officials] to Chancellor, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq:
Financing Needs and
Implications
for UK’.
123