14.2 |
Conclusions: Military equipment (post‑conflict)
30.
The Barry
Report suggested that, where UORs succeeded, “some of these were
the
result of
‘pull’ from theatre, others the result of ‘push’ from equipment
staff in the MOD. The
latter was
the case with Mastiff, the requirement for which was formulated
in London.”11
31.
As the Box
‘Attempts to articulate the PPV requirement’ below describes,
there
were repeated
references within the MOD to lack of a coherent strategy and
the
absence of
what was known as a “Customer Two lead”:12
someone
whose role it was
to identify
such a requirement from the perspective of a ‘user’. In the absence
of a
strong sponsor,
defining the PPV requirement failed to make progress for three
years.
32.
Before June
2006, the MOD’s consideration of protected mobility lacked
the
leadership
that was ultimately injected by Mr Browne’s armoured vehicle review
and
driven
forward by Lord Drayson, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and
Minister
for Defence
Procurement.
The
1998 Strategic
Defence Review did not
identify a requirement for a light or medium
weight PPV
for expeditionary operations.
The PPVs in
service with the Army in 1998, primarily to meet the requirements
of
operations
in Northern Ireland, were Tavern and the Snatch Land Rover. The Out
of
Service
Date for the Snatch Land Rover was 2002.
January
2002 – A draft
Urgent Statement of User Requirement (USUR) for the
replacement
of the Snatch Land Rover was produced (Project
DUCKBOARD).
July to
September 2003 – The MOD held
two workshops and produced an operational
analysis of
the requirement but stated that further work was needed to
articulate it.
February
2004 – Funding
re‑profiled to bring forward the delivery of 80 vehicles
from
2007 to
2004.
31 March
2004 – A
requirement for an expeditionary vehicle to be deployed to
the
“rest of the
world” was identified but the MOD stated further work was needed to
define it.
It became
known as the Type B vehicle.
June
2004 – The
Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) was advised of
a
need for
a coherent plan to deliver protected mobility for both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
7 July
2004 – The MOD
identified a requirement for three separate vehicle
projects,
including
the Type B vehicle, but described the way forward as “beset with
unresolved
issues”13
including a
lack of definition over the capabilities required and number
of
vehicles
needed.
15 October
2004 – A strategy
for delivering the three projects was produced but
there
was still
no concept of operations or a clear Customer Two lead.
11
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a
Land Perspective’.
12
Minute MOD
[junior officer] to D Jt Cap (AD Jt Mvre), 15 October 2004,
‘Strategy for delivery of
protected
patrol and combat support mobility – Project
DUCKBOARD’.
13
Paper
DEC(SP) to D Jt Cap, 7 July 2004, ‘Project DUCKBOARD – Way
Forward’.
233