The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
tendency to refer in public statements only to Iraq’s “weapons of
mass
destruction”
was likely to have created the impression that Iraq posed a
greater
threat than
the detailed JIC Assessments would have supported.
•
There was
nothing in the JIC Assessments issued before July 2002 that
would
have raised
any questions in policy‑makers’ minds about the core construct
of
Iraq’s
capabilities and intent. Indeed, from May 2001 onwards, the
perception
conveyed
was that Iraqi activity could have increased since the departure of
the
weapons
inspectors, funded by Iraq’s growing illicit income from
circumventing
the
sanctions regime.
•
In the
light of sensitivities about their content and significance,
publication of
documents
on ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’, ‘Weapons
Inspections’
and ‘Abuse
of Human Rights’ was postponed until the policy on Iraq was
clearer.
807.
The following
key findings are from Section 4.2:
•
The urgency
and certainty with which the Government stated that Iraq
was
a threat
which had to be dealt with fuelled the demand for publication of
the
dossier and
led to Mr Blair’s decision to publish it in September,
separate from
any
decision on the way ahead.
•
The dossier
was designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary
and
public
support for the Government’s position that action was urgently
required
to secure
Iraq’s disarmament.
•
The JIC
accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There is
no
evidence
that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that
No.10
improperly
influenced the text.
•
The
assessed intelligence had not
established
beyond doubt either that
Saddam Hussein
had continued to produce chemical and biological
weapons
or that
efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. The JIC should
have
made that
clear to Mr Blair.
•
In his
statement to Parliament on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair
presented Iraq’s
past,
current and potential future capabilities as evidence of the
severity of the
potential
threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; and that at some
point
in the
future that threat would become a reality.
•
The
dossier’s description of Iraq’s capabilities and intent became part
of the
baseline
against which the UK Government measured Iraq’s future
statements
and actions
and the success of weapons inspections.
•
The
widespread perception that the September 2002 dossier overstated
the
firmness of
the evidence has produced a damaging legacy which may make
it
more
difficult to secure support for Government policy, including
military action,
where the
evidence depends on inferential judgements drawn from
intelligence.
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