The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Phase IV
would need to begin at the same time as any offensive operations.
There
was a need
for PJHQ to take ownership of Phase IV planning, which should
include
OGD input.
The US were standing up JTF-4, which would be responsible for
US
Phase IV
planning; UK staff were to be embedded.”
1069.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that there was still a need for the US formally to
request
any UK
ground forces be switched to the South.
1070.
Adm Boyce
commented that:
“… it was
inconceivable that the UK would not play a part in Phase IV
operations,
which could
be enduring … There remained a need to test the plan as a
winning
concept,
but against that caveat … the plan recommended in the paper
represented
a sensible
military option with a valuable task, and … the option should be
taken
forward.”
1071.
Mr Bowen
reported the discussion to Sir David Manning, emphasising the
need
for urgent
preparatory work if the UK was to take on an AOR.514
1072.
The military
planning assumed a “decision date of 15 February and the start
of
hostilities
in very early March”. The UK was being offered an amphibious role
at the start
of
hostilities. Thereafter, US forces would move north while the UK
“took on stabilisation
of a
southern sector which would eventually include Basra”.
1073.
Mr Bowen
concluded:
“While we
are now getting more clarity about the shape of US military
intentions
in an
attack on Iraq, and the potential UK role, precious little thought
has gone
into
aftermath planning … [I]f the UK is to take on an Area of
Responsibility for
stabilisation
operations, a lot of preparatory work is needed urgently. MOD have
in
mind to
engage with FCO, DFID & DTI on this.”
1074.
By 14 January,
PJHQ had established a team to examine post-conflict
issues.515
1075.
The PJHQ
proposals for improved inter-departmental co-ordination began to
take
shape later
in the month.516
1076.
A letter from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David Manning on 8 January
reported
the US
offer of “an alternative role for a UK ground force in the South”
and described
potential
roles for UK forces (see Section 6.2).517
514
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff meeting on
[8] January’.
515
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq’.
516
Minute
PJHQ/Hd of J9 Pol/Ops to MA/DCJO(Ops), 20 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
Taking Forward
Aftermath
Planning’.
517
Letter
Williams to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK land
Contribution’.
294