10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
PRT
structure which best fitted the situation in the South and to
ensure that the PRTs
assisted
rather than hindered “our main transition effort”.
469.
The Cabinet
Office chaired a video conference of officials in London, PJHQ,
Basra
and Baghdad
on 5 January 2006 to discuss how to establish PRTs in the
South.269
The
record of
the meeting stated that:
“With the
US in disarray over PRTs, and following further UK scoping work
in
theatre, a
4-2-1 approach to PRTs no longer appears to be either a
necessary
or best
solution.”
470.
There was a
fundamental mismatch between:
•
the
timelines for UK military transition in Maysan and Muthanna
(planned for
May 2006,
only five months away);
•
the
civilian and military resources available; and
•
the time
needed to recruit, train, deploy and get value from staff posted
into
a new
PRT.
471.
A focus on
Basra and Dhi Qar was likely to be “sellable to the
US”.
472.
The meeting
concluded that Ministers should be invited to agree a
revised
approach
that focused on Basra and Dhi Qar.
473.
Ministers
approved the new approach, comprising a UK-led PRT in Basra
and
an Italian-led
PRT in Dhi Qar, later that month.270
474.
A DFID
official briefed Mr Benn on 31 January that:
“We [DFID]
are working to ensure that management mechanisms and
funding
remain
shared responsibilities between the three departments [MOD, FCO
and
DFID]. We
would welcome a discussion with you about our ideas on how to
remain
helpful and
engaged, while avoiding being asked to lead on
PRTs.” 271
475.
The UK-led PRT
in Basra was established in May 2006.
476.
In her
evidence to the Inquiry, Ms Cameron, who had visited Iraq over
Christmas
2005 to
help develop the UK’s response to the US PRT proposal, suggested
that the
need to see
off the “bad ideas” encapsulated in the proposal, and the need to
develop
a response
which did not undermine the UK’s plans for transition in the South,
had
meant that
the UK had not had the time to stand back and think through what it
needed
to deliver
in Basra.272
She
concluded that the PRT model was an improvement on the
269
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior
official] 5 January 2006, ‘Iraq: PRTs’.
270
Paper DFID,
10 January 2006, ‘Iraq Update’.
271
Paper DFID,
10 January 2006, ‘Iraq Update’.
272
Public
hearing, 22 June 2010, pages 100-101.
275