The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
59.
In 2002, an
MOD review of the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR)
reaffirmed
that the
UK’s Armed Forces were not equipped to support two enduring medium
scale
military
operations at the same time:
“Since the
SDR we have assumed that we should plan to be able to
undertake
either a
single major operation (of a similar scale and duration to our
contribution to
the Gulf
War in 1990‑91), or undertake a more extended overseas deployment
on
a lesser
scale (as in the mid‑1990s in Bosnia), while retaining the ability
to mount
a second
substantial deployment … if this were made necessary by a second
crisis.
We would
not, however, expect both deployments to involve war‑fighting or
to
maintain
them simultaneously for longer than 6 months.”26
60.
Between 2004
and 2006, the MOD regularly made reference to the impact that
an
additional
deployment would have on key capabilities available for Iraq.
Choices would
have to be
made in deploying a finite level of capability.
61.
When the
Defence and Overseas Policy Sub‑Committee of Cabinet agreed
in
July 2005
to deploy around 2,500 personnel to Helmand province, Afghanistan,
the UK
was still
engaged in a medium scale operation in Iraq. As set out in Section
9.8, the
assumptions
about when personnel might be withdrawn from Iraq were high
risk.
62.
In March 2010,
the DOC recognised that running two medium scale
operations
concurrently
had had a “profound and fundamental impact” on resources afforded
to
Iraq.27
It
concluded that “knowingly exceeding Defence Planning Assumptions
requires
the most
rigorous analysis”. The Inquiry has not seen evidence of such
analysis.
63.
It is
difficult to determine whether or not Ministers adequately
appreciated what the
July 2005
decision to deploy to Helmand meant for the capabilities available
for Iraq.
There were
discussions about the over‑stretch and pinch‑points in provision
but those
were no
substitute for the “rigorous analysis” to which the DOC
referred.
64.
Decisions were
not based on a realistic assessment of the likely duration of
either
operation
and were consequently flawed.
65.
One example
was the decision not to harden accommodation for British troops
in
Iraq in
March 2005. That decision was supported by balanced and pragmatic
advice but
the UK’s
optimistic assessment of how soon operations in Iraq would conclude
affected
its
analysis of the requirement. That meant that the issue had to be
re‑opened three
years later
when it was too late for the matter to be addressed in an
appropriate and
cost‑effective
way.
26
Ministry of
Defence, Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter, July
2002.
27
Report DOC,
17 March 2010, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol. 4’.
238