6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
the lead
times for operations to allow the maximum time for the
“UN/diplomatic process
to unfold”.
The MOD warned that US forces would reach a peak of readiness in
February
and that a
“use it or lose it” argument might come into play in
Washington.
1139.
Turkey
remained “a key uncertainty”. The MOD understood that basing for
US
land forces
had not yet been agreed, but “preparatory activity (reconnaissance
visits,
etc)”,
looked “like at least an amber light”. The Pentagon had told the
MOD that Turkey
had given
“neither a definite Yes nor a definite No” to UK forces.
Mr Straw had received
a “similar
response … with some suggestion that their position might depend on
the
details of
any UK request” (in his discussions on 3 December). Turkey and the
UK
“ought to”
have bilateral discussions.
1140.
The MOD was
considering with the FCO the “best approach to securing
Turkish
agreement,
taking into account our wider interests”. The MOD judged that
there
was
unlikely to be any progress until after the meeting of the European
Council in
Copenhagen
(12 to 13 December). Action could include a visit by Mr Hoon
accompanied
by Adm
Boyce, who had “developed a good rapport with his opposite number”,
and
Sir Kevin
Tebbit who would draw on “his extensive experience of
Turkey”.
1141.
It was
“increasingly difficult, for both US and UK staffs, to plan and
prepare in the
abstract
without knowing where the UK land package will be based”. While
there were
risks that
Turkey could “interpret … UK preparations as taking their
acquiescence for
granted”,
the UK could not wait for an answer from Turkey if it wished “to
remain aligned
with US
planning”. Although those preparations were “not particularly tied”
to a northern
option,
there were presentational risks such as the media concluding that
the UK was
“all
dressed up with no place to go”.
1142.
The MOD stated
that the steps required to bring the additional air and
naval
forces in
Package 2 into line with US timescales were “relatively limited”,
but a
“significant
readiness gap” was developing between US and UK “amphibious
and
land forces”.
1143.
The actions
proposed by the MOD included:
•
Deploying
additional naval forces for “maritime interdiction
operations,
force protection,
defensive mine warfare and logistics support” around
22 January
2003.
•
Nominating
and informing units in the ATG and bringing their readiness to
five
days’
Notice to Move from the beginning of January and chartering four
ships to
support the
ATG by 19 December, with the intention that it would deploy
around
16
January.
•
Bringing
the RAF elements of Package 2 to 10 days’ Notice to Move or
less
on 27
December, and pre‑positioning weapons and equipment in Turkey
on
30 December.
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