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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
404.  Maj Gen Houghton also highlighted the need for “honest acceptance” of the likely
timescales, stating:
“The Iraqiisation of the Security Sector is not a deliverable on 01 July. It is a
possibility that a largely Iraqiised Security Sector could deliver security for elections
in Jan 05.”
405.  Maj Gen Houghton assessed:
“The biggest single thing that will move the creation of capability forward is the
increased use of military and police assets in mentoring roles. This should involve,
for example, widening the concept of embedding troops within Iraqi Civil Defence
Corps (ICDC) Units. Given available assets this will mean taking risk on maintaining
security.”
406.  On developing a strategy, Maj Gen Houghton stated that it must be “authored,
owned and executed” in Iraq, not in London. It should also deal with policy on militias
and define an end‑state as there was no agreement on the constitutional, legal and
judicial framework within which the security sector should operate. He also highlighted
the difficulties that the transfer of sovereignty and the associated drawdown of the CPA
would have in terms of loss of control and discontinuity of personnel.
407.  In a “follow‑up piece” to the paper, Maj Gen Houghton provided more detail on
how a strategy should be developed.350 The strategy should include a “vision”, such as:
“A secure and stable Iraq maintained by credible, self‑confident and capable security
structures under Iraqi governance”.
408.  Derived from that vision should be an outline of the security sector architecture.
Maj Gen Houghton highlighted some “key policy decisions” that would need to be made
in each area:
“(1) Iraqi Police Service (IPS). There needs to be agreement on the principle of
Police Primacy (or not) in International Security (IS) issues. Will the Police Service
be controlled nationally or regionally? … Will it have a special weapons and tactics
capability; if so how much and under whose control? …
“(2) Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). Is the ICDC a temporary or a permanent
creation? …
“(3) Iraqi Army. What is the role of the Iraqi Army in IS? …”
350  Minute ACDS(Ops) to Rycroft, June 2004, ‘How Best to Progress the Iraqiisation of the
Security Sector’.
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