12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
404.
Maj Gen Houghton
also highlighted the need for “honest acceptance” of the
likely
timescales,
stating:
“The
Iraqiisation of the Security Sector is not a deliverable on 01
July. It is a
possibility
that a largely Iraqiised Security Sector could deliver security for
elections
in Jan
05.”
405.
Maj Gen Houghton
assessed:
“The
biggest single thing that will move the creation of capability
forward is the
increased
use of military and police assets in mentoring roles. This should
involve,
for
example, widening the concept of embedding troops within Iraqi
Civil Defence
Corps
(ICDC) Units. Given available assets this will mean taking risk on
maintaining
security.”
406.
On developing
a strategy, Maj Gen Houghton stated that it must be
“authored,
owned and
executed” in Iraq, not in London. It should also deal with policy
on militias
and define
an end‑state as there was no agreement on the constitutional, legal
and
judicial
framework within which the security sector should operate. He also
highlighted
the
difficulties that the transfer of sovereignty and the associated
drawdown of the CPA
would have
in terms of loss of control and discontinuity of
personnel.
407.
In a
“follow‑up piece” to the paper, Maj Gen Houghton provided
more detail on
how a
strategy should be developed.350
The
strategy should include a “vision”, such as:
“A secure
and stable Iraq maintained by credible, self‑confident and capable
security
structures
under Iraqi governance”.
408.
Derived from
that vision should be an outline of the security sector
architecture.
Maj Gen Houghton
highlighted some “key policy decisions” that would need to be
made
in each
area:
“(1) Iraqi
Police Service (IPS). There needs to be agreement on the principle
of
Police
Primacy (or not) in International Security (IS) issues. Will the
Police Service
be
controlled nationally or regionally? … Will it have a special
weapons and tactics
capability;
if so how much and under whose control? …
“(2) Iraqi
Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). Is the ICDC a temporary or a
permanent
creation?
…
“(3) Iraqi
Army. What is the role of the Iraqi Army in IS? …”
350
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to Rycroft, June 2004, ‘How Best to Progress the
Iraqiisation of the
Security Sector’.
145