14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
68.
It is not
clear precisely when the draft was finalised, but
Lt Gen Reith stated in
a paper
on 14 April that the operational concept had been
agreed.29
The
development
of the
operational concept is addressed in Section 8.
69.
Lt Gen Reith
produced two papers on the roulement and recovery of UK
forces.30
On the
operational requirement for UK land forces he wrote:
“In broad
terms a mix of capabilities will be needed at each ‘strongpoint’,
providing
the local
commander with maximum flexibility. This will include the retention
of some
armour,
armoured/mechanised infantry and artillery support, but would
increasingly
rely on
operations ‘amongst the people’ on foot. The ability to ‘find’ and
remove
hostile
elements is critical; ISTAR/HUMINT [human intelligence] will
continue to
be
required. Reserves, in some cases with mobility provided by hels
[helicopters],
would be
required to surge into rural areas … Force protection requirements
are
likely to
increase as the UK occupies permanent bases. Additional companies
may
be needed
to provide security, possibly provided by the TA.”
70.
For
battlefield helicopters, Lt Gen Reith suggested that the
main force should
consist
of:
•
five
Chinook;
•
five Sea
King or Puma; and
•
five Lynx,
with Sea King and Puma operating only at night, or some
eight
Chinook,
but with “potential longer term ramifications for the
fleet”.
71.
Lt Gen Reith
suggested that Lynx could be used to provide aerial surveillance
but
that the
deployment of Puma, Gazelle or an Islander aircraft would be “more
sensible”
although
they could “only be provided at the expense of the capability
currently deployed
in Northern
Ireland”.
72.
On equipment
husbandry, Lt Gen Reith stated:
“Time and
cost prevent the procurement of further environment and protection
UOR
enhancements
to equipment. This will require the majority of combat vehicles
to
remain in
theatre.”
73.
On 15 April,
Lt Gen Reith produced an SOR for South‑East Iraq for the
Chiefs of
Staff.31
In an annex
there was an assessment of each of the provinces under the
UK’s
Area of
Responsibility (AOR), including a judgement on the levels of
consent to the
Coalition
amongst the local population. That was used as an indicator of
whether or
not the
Coalition faced any threat of attack.
29
Paper
Reith, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase IV Roulement/Recovery of UK Land
Forces’.
30
Minute
Reith to SECCOS, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement and recovery of
UK forces’ attaching
Paper CJO,
14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement and Recovery of UK Air forces’
and Paper CJO, 14 April
2003,
‘Phase 4: Roulement and Recovery of UK Land forces’.
31
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 15 April 2003, ‘The Statement of Requirement
(SOR) for SE Iraq’.
15