The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

al-Sadr remained close to [JAM1], as we had understood [JAM1] was no longer

under the control of al-Sadr. The action against [JAM1] had not been directed at

al-Sadr, but at an organiser of lethal attacks against UK forces. HMG saw al-Sadr’s

increasing involvement in the political process as a positive development and one to

be encouraged. [The organisation to which the senior official belonged] believed it

would be in his [MAS1’s] interests to distance himself from people such as [JAM1].”

257.  The individual making the approach, to whom the Inquiry will refer as MAS1:

“… considered that when he passed back the message of no negotiation over the

detention of [JAM1], al-Sadr would still be interested in his representatives meeting

HMG officials … without preconditions, to discuss the broader way ahead. [MAS1]

felt that al-Sadr wanted to continue moving in to mainstream politics, but to do this

he needed to resolve the conflicts in the South. His attempt to have [JAM1] released

did not necessarily mean that they were still closely associated. It could be that

al‑Sadr was not strong enough to be seen publicly to abandon [JAM1]. If [there was

confirmation] … that HMG wanted to go ahead with a meeting, he would find out

who would represent al-Sadr in advance. In return … [MAS1] would need to confirm

who was coming from HMG, ie officials from the FCO or …”

258.  Mr Asquith was advised that MAS1:

“… has sufficient track record to warrant taking this approach seriously. The value

of proceeding with a meeting … would depend on who was designated as al-Sadr’s

representative. But in current circumstances, I suggest it would be worthwhile

establishing a channel to al-Sadr, if only to explain why UK forces took the action

they did in Basra. If the channel develops, it could help to reduce tension in

MND(SE) and, more broadly, assist in the political process as we move towards the

referendum and elections. It would therefore act as a line of Shia outreach in parallel

to those … with the Sunnis.”

259.  The recommendation was for a meeting with Muqtada al-Sadr’s representatives.

260.  Mr Asquith wrote on the minute: “I agree the meeting should proceed.”126 He added

that Mr Patey must be kept “fully in the picture” and that establishing a nominated

representative of Muqtada al-Sadr in Basra was an important objective for the meeting.

261.  On 27 September, Mr Patey sent a report to the FCO in London entitled ‘Sadrist

Outreach’.127 In it he reported a meeting with MAS1, “a senior Sadrist understood to be

close to Muqtada al-Sadr” who “claims [JAM1] innocent of charges against him and of

attacks on British forces and asks for his immediate release” and suggested that “his

continued detention will ensure the hostility of Jaysh al-Mahdi to British forces in Basra”.

126  Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to Asquith, 22 September 2005,

‘Overture from Muqtada al-Sadr’ including manuscript comment Asquith.

127  eGram 14221/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 27 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra: call on Sadrist [MAS1]’.

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