6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

remove Saddam … The private language of the vast majority of those to whom we

speak is ‘when rather than if’.

…

“But the most vexed issue is probably the ‘day after’ question – what does the US

do with a conquered Iraq. [Mr William] Burns [State Department Assistant Secretary

Near East] has told me that they are increasingly thinking in terms of some form of

democracy, but recognised that this would need to be propped up by a long term

international (i.e. almost certainly US) security presence. They have of course

been working hard on their contacts with the Iraqi opposition … to prepare for this

eventuality. However the opposition have made clear they want to be in charge –

this should not be a ‘foreign invasion’. And some Administration contacts are realistic

about the democracy objective – the nature of the opposition groups and the political

culture of Iraq; and the difficulty of justifying pursuing the conflict if a benign dictator

overthrew Saddam.”186

326. Mr Brenton’s letter was seen by Mr Blair before a telephone call between

Mr Blair and Mr Straw on 19 August in preparation for Mr Straw’s meeting with

Secretary Powell.187

327. On 19 August, Dr Michael Williams, Mr Straw’s Special Adviser, sent Mr Straw a

paper on the lessons for Iraq of other US military interventions since 1945.188 Dr Williams

advised that:

“… a UN mandate will be essential for post-war Iraq. It will simply not be possible

for the US to do this alone as it found out after UK intervention in Afghanistan.

Experience elsewhere – in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor – has underlined

the necessity of the UN as the mechanism indispensable for the marshalling of

global, political and economic support in the context of post-war construction.”

328. At Mr Straw’s request, Dr Williams’ paper was copied to Sir Michael Jay and

Sir David Manning.189

329. On 20 August, Mr Straw visited the US for talks on Iraq with Secretary Powell

(see Section 3.4).190

186 Letter Brenton to Private Secretary [FCO], 15 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.

187 Manuscript comment Wechsberg, 19 August 2002, on Letter Brenton to Private Secretary [FCO],

15 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.

188 Minute Williams to Secretary of State [FCO], 19 August 2002, ‘The United States and Iraq:

Historical Parallels’.

189 Manuscript comment McDonald on Minute Williams to Secretary of State [FCO], 19 August 2002,

‘The United States and Iraq: Historical Parallels’.

190 Letter McDonald to Manning, 21 August 2002, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Visit to the US, 20 August 2002’.

167