3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
think it
was worth going down the ultimatum route”. It would be important
for
Mr Blair
“to set out the political context” to President Bush.
343.
Mr Rycroft
wrote that the meeting concluded:
“•
We should
work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military
action. But
we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could
take
any firm
decisions. CDS [Adm Boyce] should tell the US military that we
were
considering
a range of options.
•
The Prime
Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be
spent
in
preparation for this operation.
•
CDS would send
the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military
campaign
and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
•
The Foreign
Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on
the
UN inspections
and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam …
•
John
Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.
•
We must not
ignore the legal issues: the Attorney General would consider
legal
advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.”
344.
Mr Rycroft’s
detailed record of the meeting was sent to the participants
only.
345.
Mr Rycroft
sent a separate letter to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 23 July,
which
very
briefly summarised the action points for the FCO, MOD and Cabinet
Office.135
They were:
•
Mr Straw to
provide advice on the positions of countries in the region,
the
background
on UN inspectors, and – discreet – work on an ultimatum
to
Saddam
Hussein. These were requested by 30 July.
•
Adm Boyce
to tell the US military that the UK was considering a range of
options
for any UK
involvement in any military operation. He was also to send Mr
Blair
full
details of the proposed military campaign, and options for a UK
contribution,
by 30 July
or earlier if they were available.
•
Mr Scarlett
to provide updated intelligence on a weekly basis for Mr
Blair’s
weekend
box.
346.
In his account
of the meeting, Mr Campbell wrote that:
“C [Sir
Richard Dearlove] reported his strong feeling that the US had
pretty much
made up
their minds.
“TB was
asking whether the Iraqis would welcome an invasion or not. Jack
[Straw]
felt the
regime would appear to be popular until it tips, but when it tips,
it will happen
quickly.
All the signs out of Washington were that their thinking had moved
forward,
135
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July: Follow Up’.
61