The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
883.
In a
discussion on the position of Russia, Secretary Powell said that
Mr Ivanov had
stated that
there was nothing in it for Russia to vote for the second
resolution. It meant
an end to
inspections and Iraq’s neighbours were not threatened by Saddam
Hussein.
884.
In the context
of remarks reported to have been made during a visit to
China,
Secretary
Powell had asked Mr Ivanov if Russia would veto the second
resolution.
Mr Ivanov
had responded, “You know me better than that”; he had simply
been
explaining
that, under the UN Charter, Russia had the right of veto but he had
avoided
getting
drawn into whether it would be used. Secretary Powell would be
urging President
Bush to
speak to President Putin.
885.
Mr Straw
reported that he had told Secretary Powell that the level of
support in
the UK for
military action without a second resolution was palpably “very
low”. In that
circumstance,
even if a majority in the Security Council had voted for the
resolution with
only France
exercising its veto, he was “increasingly pessimistic about whether
we could
carry the
Party” to support military action.
886.
Mr Straw
added that the debate in the UK was:
“…
significantly defined by the tone of the debate in Washington and
particularly
remarks
made by the President and others to the right of him, which
suggested that
the US
would go to war whatever and was not bothered about a second
resolution
one way or
another.”
887.
Mr Straw
had proposed consideration of additional language in the
second
resolution
“pledging immunity to Saddam and entourage if he were to leave Iraq
by a
specific
date”. Secretary Powell had declined, commenting that he did not
think Saddam
Hussein
would agree.
888.
Mr Straw
sought Mr Blair’s agreement to adding an ultimatum to the
draft
889.
Mr Straw
wrote: “Things may be moving towards a majority but I will not
believe
it until it
happens”, There were concerns that the draft resolution looked like
a “fait
accompli”
and a “blank cheque for war”. Key potential allies “needed a better
reason” for
supporting
the resolution.
890.
Mr Straw’s
view was that the language in the resolution on performance
targets
and
deadlines would not be acceptable “to either US or UK for obvious
reasons”, but he
had “two
thoughts”:
•
an offer,
subject to legal advice, of safety and immunity if Saddam
Hussein
would go
into exile; and
•
returning
to the earlier idea of setting out publicly some key benchmarks
against
which
Iraq’s “full and active” compliance could be judged.
275
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
340