The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
from 2002.
The letter said that for domestic reasons the PSNI would no longer
be in a
position to
contribute to overseas police missions.
471.
On 6 November,
Ms Jane Kennedy, Minister of State for Northern Ireland,
wrote
to
Mr Straw stating that Mr Orde had agreed to identify at
least six and up to 10 “PSNI
officers of
Inspector to Superintendent ranks with operational experience in
working
with the
military willing to undertake a secondment to
Basra”.415
Ms Kennedy
stated
that
Mr Orde
had also indicated that he would consider further deployments under
the
“auspices
of ACPO”.
472.
In a visit
report dated 18 November (described earlier in this Section),
CC
Kernaghan
recommended an increase in UK police officers deployed to both
Baghdad
and
Basra.416
He
highlighted that only 27 of the 43 police forces in England and
Wales –
and six of
the eight in Scotland – had nominated officers to serve in Iraq. He
welcomed
the
willingness of the Northern Ireland Office/PSNI to deploy police
officers to Iraq but
cautioned
that the PSNI should not be seen as a separate entity. In
particular he was
concerned
that they should not be expected to take greater risks than other
UK police
officers.
473.
The
development of police training across Iraq is discussed in Box,
‘Police training
academies’,
earlier in this Section.
474.
Plans for the
Jordan academy were discussed at the Iraq Senior Officials
Group
on 9
September.417
The IPU
briefing for the meeting stated that the 21 UK officers
could
be deployed
by the end of December and that other troop‑contributing nations
should be
encouraged
to send trainers.418
475.
The minutes of
the meeting stated:
“The Home
Secretary and ACPO were content in principle with the deployment
of
UK police
trainers … This could happen … before the end of October. However
…
[they]
would need to see a plan for the school including a security
assessment, and
a more
defined strategy for policing than existed at
present.”419
476.
At that stage,
deployment of UK police officers for the facility was being
delayed
by lack
of firearms training or adequate security provisions for them to
deploy without
415
Letter
Kennedy to Straw, 6 November 2003, ‘UK Policing Assistance –
Iraq’.
416
Report
Kernaghan to Straw, 18 November 2003, ‘Report on Second Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
11/11/03‑14/11/03’.
417
Letter Dodd
to Sheinwald, 10 September 2003, [untitled].
418
Paper IPU,
8 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Action Plan’.
419
Letter Dodd
to Sheinwald, 10 September 2003, [untitled].
420
Minute FCO,
18 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Police Training: Update: 18
September’; Email White
to UND
[junior
official], 21 September 2003, ‘Re: Police Training
plan’.
160