10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
“Garner’s
outfit, ORHA, is an unbelievable mess. No leadership, no
strategy,
no co‑ordination,
no structure, and inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis …
“I have not
yet been out of the capital, but it is clear that Baghdad is the
biggest
problem …
Baghdad has the worst security, a poor level of essential
services,
and no
information flow. I will recommend to Bremer a Baghdad First
strategy. We
can afford
some of the regions to languish. But failure in Baghdad would
fatally
undermine
our success in the conflict.”199
356.
Mr Sawers
listed the main challenges:
•
There would
be no progress until security improved.
•
There
needed to be a clear and credible de-Ba’athification policy. ORHA
had
made
mistakes by appointing “quite senior” Ba’ath Party figures as their
main
partners in
the Trade and Health Ministries, and at Baghdad
University.
•
With
security and credible de-Ba’athification would come the chance
for
“durable
reconstruction”. Bechtel was moving far too slowly. It needed
“to
swamp
Baghdad with engineers and skilled labour”. Quick impact projects
were
also needed
to demonstrate that progress was being made. Those were not
a
substitute
for long-term development, but would meet genuine needs and
were
a “political
requirement”.
•
The
Coalition needed to do more to get out its messages.
•
Money
needed to be found to pay public sector workers. US$740m in
seized
Iraqi funds
that could be used was held up in Washington.
357.
Ambassador
Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May, to take up post
as
Head of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).200
Lt Gen
Garner was to leave Iraq
on 1
June, at which point ORHA would be incorporated into the
CPA.201
358.
The names
‘ORHA’ and ‘CPA’ continued to be used interchangeably in
documents
seen by the
Inquiry for some time after Ambassador Bremer’s
appointment.
359.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that, although he was “the senior Brit on
the
ground”, he
was not Ambassador Bremer’s deputy nor was he in the line
management
chain of
ORHA or the CPA.202
Rather, he
was a representative of the UK Government
and so his
role was one of “exerting influence rather than exercising
power”.
199
Telegram 2
IraqRep to FCO London, 11 May 2003, ‘Personal: Iraq: What’s Going
Wrong?’.
200
Telegram 5
IraqRep to FCO London, 12 May 2003, ‘Bremer’s First
Moves’.
201
Telegram
027 Baghdad to London, 1 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Coalition Provisional
Authority’.
202
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 56 and 58.
65