3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
meant in
our heads by that, but that’s the nature of a negotiation like
that. You come
up with
some language that can encapsulate both those things
simultaneously, but it
doesn’t
remove the ambiguity.”290
858.
Asked whether
the French position had remained that the use of force could
only
be
authorised by a decision of the Security Council, Sir John replied
that was essentially
the French
position, but:
“They were
a little bit wary about articulating that as clearly as they might
have done,
and I think
that’s because, like us, they had always had this concern, a
broader
concern,
not related to any particular situation, that they didn’t want to
be in a
position
where military action in the modern world could only be authorised
by the
859.
Mr Blair’s
statement of 8 November focused on the decision made by the
UN
that Iraq
must comply with its obligations, and the choice for Saddam Hussein
of
whether to
disarm willingly.
860.
Mr Blair
also stated that he hoped that disarmament would be
achieved
peacefully.
861.
In a statement
issued on 8 November, Mr Blair expressed delight that the
Security
Council had
risen to the challenge and, by unanimously adopting resolution
1441, it had
“made clear
beyond doubt” that Iraq had to comply with its obligations to the
UN.292
•
Iraq’s
obligation was to co‑operate with the weapons inspectors. It was
“not a
game of
hide and seek, where the inspectors try their best to find the
weapons
and Saddam
does his best to conceal them”.
•
The “duty
of co‑operation” meant “not just access but information. Failure to
be
open and
honest in helping the inspectors … is every bit as much a breach
as
failure to
allow access to sites.”
•
The
survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime was “in his hands”. Conflict
was “not
inevitable”.
Disarmament was.
•
In the
event of Saddam refusing to co‑operate or a breach, there would
be
“a further
UN discussion”. There was no “automatic trigger” in the
resolution.
•
“But
everyone now accepts that if there is a default … the
international
community
must act to enforce its will. Failure to do so would mean,
having
stated our
clear demand, we lacked the will to enforce it.”
290
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 25‑26.
291
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, page 30.
292
The
National Archives, 8 November 2002, PM
statement on Iraq following UN Security Council
resolution.
353