The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
financial
situation”. Ms Short reported that Mr Brown “had indicated to
her, in a private
conversation,
that he ‘would do what he could to help’”.
642.
The same day,
Dr Brewer sent Mr Bowen and senior officials in the MOD, FCO
and
Treasury a
letter setting out Ms Short’s position on what DFID could do
following any
conflict.278
The letter
reflected the conclusions of Ms Short’s meeting with DFID
officials
on 18
February and Dr Brewer’s presentation to the Chiefs of Staff on 19
February.279
“Although
she [Ms Short] would be keen for DFID to support an
exemplary
humanitarian
effort in any UK-controlled sector, our [DFID’s] role will be
constrained
by the
extent of the UN mandate and the financial resources available to
us.
We have a
strong commitment to the UN agencies, and would want to
allocate
significant
funding to them under most scenarios. Drawing heavily on
our
contingency
reserve and existing humanitarian aid and Iraq budget lines is
unlikely
to release
more than £60-70m for humanitarian assistance to Iraq in 2003/04.
Given
our
predictions of the humanitarian needs, with this level of funding
we would not be
able to
play the exemplary role [in the South] the Prime Minister has asked
for, and
it would
be irresponsible of us to plan to do so.”
644.
On the UN
mandate, Dr Brewer stated:
“The role
which DFID can play in funding our usual humanitarian partners may
be
further
constrained by perceptions of the legality of any conflict and what
happens
afterwards,
and also by humanitarian principles of impartiality and
independence.
UN mandates
justifying not only military force but also a continuing
international
presence
afterwards are critical to ensuring the international community can
engage
fully with
the predicted enormous needs.”
645.
Dr Brewer
described DFID’s potential role under four scenarios closely based
on
those
discussed at the DFID meeting on 18 February:
•
“No second
UNSCR, no mandated UN humanitarian role.” DFID would
fund
those
international agencies willing to accept UK money and best placed
to
respond.
•
“Second
UNSCR but no mandated UN humanitarian role (overall US
lead).”
DFID would
additionally fund UK military QIPs, although without
additional
resources,
the total was unlikely to exceed £5m. “We have doubts about
how
much the UN
would be able to do beyond immediate relief with only a
thin
second SCR
if a US-led Coalition assumed medium-term control of the
country.”
278
Letter
Brewer to Bowen, 24 February 2003, [untitled].
279
Minute
Fernie to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID], 21 February
2003, ‘Iraq: Deployment
Options’.
424