1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
facilities
had been involved … through a specific middleman” and some
components
had been
delivered in July 1995. Other components had been stored in transit
in
Jordan.
A Director General of an Iraqi missile facility stated that he
had destroyed the
components
received in August 1995 and informed the Iraqi authorities of the
receipt of
proscribed
items in August and October. There were still “contradictions and
ambiguities”
about what
had happened, but Iraq was reluctant to broaden the
investigation.
222.
There were
suspicions that items still existed and Iraq was withholding
important
documents.
Although no proscribed items had been found, Iraq’s actions in
March meant
that
UNSCOM’s confidence had been diminished.
223.
Iraq had
provided a new draft disclosure in relation to chemical weapons
in
February
1996. This was an improvement in some areas, but there were
important gaps.
These
included:
•
the “level
of expertise achieved in research and development activities …
large-
scale
production techniques, weaponisation and delivery
systems”;
•
the absence
of disclosures on precursor production capabilities and
dual-use
equipment
within the civilian chemical industry; and
•
Iraq’s
activities in relation to “V class” agents.
224.
In the new
draft disclosure the quantities of precursor chemicals and agents
and
munitions
produced, procured and destroyed had been changed but the source of
the
new
information was not clear. UNSCOM’s “strong presumption” was that
it was based
on
information which Iraq had not disclosed.
225.
Specifically,
there were changes in the figures for the production
and
weaponisation
of VX:
•
“Initially
Iraq stated that only laboratory scale synthesis had been
undertaken.”
•
In March
1995, Iraq had admitted “production of 260 kilograms
and
weaponisation
of the agent in three aerial bombs”.
•
In November
1995, Iraq had declared that it had produced “3.3
tonnes”.
•
In the
February disclosure, the figure for production had “increased by a
further
20 per
cent”.
•
Iraq had
not produced evidence to substantiate its statement that
the
“precursors
for the large-scale production of VX” had been
destroyed.
226.
Iraq had
assisted in excavations of buildings at al-Muthanna, Iraq’s
largest
chemical
weapons research and production facility, which were destroyed in
February
1991.
Records and “some 80 munitions and components” had been recovered,
including
“122
millimetre artillery chemical warheads and 155 millimetre ‘binary’
artillery shells”.
63