11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
the aim of
having a cross‑sectarian draft presented to the Iraqi parliament by
the
Presidency
Council.”
279.
In a separate
‘Update on de‑Ba’athification’, also dated February 2007, the
IPU
explained
that “we want to see the de‑Ba’athification process reformed and
ultimately
brought to
an end”.221
In the
short term, the objective was to reform the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission
so that it operated in a more independent and transparent way.
Specifically,
this meant
that it should:
“– … target
an individual’s conduct, not membership of the Ba’ath party,
reinforcing
the
underlying principle that de‑Ba’athification should be a judicial
rather than
political
process;
– review
the cases of all individuals who have already been de‑Ba’athified,
as the
previous
process was deeply flawed due to political
interference;
– complete
the de‑Ba’athification process within a defined
period.”
280.
The IPU
explained that the draft US/UK text proposed abolishing
the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission and replacing it with a “Reconciliation and
Accountability
Commission”
for six months. President Talabani had indicated that he was
broadly
content
with the US/UK text. If the Presidency Council exercised its right
to put the draft
law to the
Council of Representatives directly, and other drafts were also
presented, they
were likely
to be considered by a Committee of the Council.
281.
On 5 March,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to the Private Secretary to
Mrs
Margaret
Beckett, the Foreign Secretary:
“The Prime
Minister would like us to get a UK adviser on reconciliation into
Maliki’s
office as
quickly as possible … We also need to build influence with
Abdul‑Mehdi on
de‑Ba’athification
… The Prime Minister is pleased at UK/US efforts to ensure
that
there is
now a single document on de‑Ba’athification with
Talabani.”222
282.
In an update
for Mr Blair on 23 March, his Private Secretary reported a
sense that
Iraqi
politicians risked missing the opportunity presented by the Baghdad
Security Plan
(see
Section 9.5) to pursue reconciliation.223
He wrote
that “faltering progress on the oil
law and on
de‑Ba’athification” were contributing to increased suspicion within
the Sunni
community.
283.
In his Weekly
Assessment dated 29 March, Mr Asquith reported that the
proposed
new
de‑Ba’athification Law had become “another victim of the US
fixation on security
221
Paper IPU,
February 2007, ‘Update on de‑Ba’athification’.
222
Letter
Fletcher to Hickey, 5 March 2007, ‘Iraq’.
223
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 23 March 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 23
March’.
53