3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
Al Qaida
terrorists in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) previously
noted
testing and
producing chemical and biological substances remain active
and
are likely
to attack Coalition forces.
•
Senior Al
Qaida associated terrorists may have established sleeper cells in
Iraq,
to be
activated during a Coalition occupation.
•
Iraq
continues to prepare for terrorist attacks against Western
interests in the
Middle
East, Europe, South-East Asia and elsewhere, although the
regime’s
capability
remains limited, especially beyond the Middle East.”
396.
Other key
elements from the Assessment are set out in the Box
below.
Islamist
terrorists
•
There was “a
substantial body of reporting of plans by Al Qaida and other
Islamist
terrorists
for attacks in the Middle East”.
•
“Arrests of
extremists involved in chemical/biological (CB) attack plans in
Bahrain
may have
reduced the threat of an attack there linked to conflict with Iraq.
But the
full
distribution of instructions for making CB devices has yet to be
uncovered […]”
•
“A substantial
body of reporting (much of which is also uncorroborated)
suggests
targeting
against UK and US interests.”
•
Al Qaida
retained “a strong determination to mount attacks in both
countries”.
Islamist
terrorists in Iraq
•
Reporting
since 10 February had suggested that the senior Al Qaida
associate,
Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, had “established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be
activated
during a US
occupation of the city”.
•
It was
“possible” that the sleeper cells had “received CB materials from
terrorists
in the
KAZ”.
•
“Whatever the
precise relationship between al-Zarqawi and his DGI [Directorate
of
General
Intelligence] contacts”, it was “unlikely that he could conduct
activities in
Iraq
without the knowledge (and probably the support) of the
regime”.
Conclusion
•
“Despite
serious setbacks for Al Qaida, and some disruption of terrorist
activity,
especially
in the Middle East, the threat from Islamist terrorism in the event
of
war with
Iraq remains high, with continuing evidence of attack planning. We
can
expect Al
Qaida to persist with plans for at least one major attack to
coincide with
an outbreak
of hostilities, as well as widespread attempts at low-level attacks
by
extremist
groups and individuals worldwide, especially in the Middle East,
Africa
and
South-East Asia.”
•
The JIC judged
that the threat from Al Qaida remained “greater than any
terrorist
threat from
Iraq”.
469