The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Hold and
steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political
and
economic
outreach with our military operations.
•
Build
truly national
institutions working with more capable provincial and
local
authorities.
Embodying a national compact – not tools of a particular sect
or
ethnic
group – these Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces,
bring rule
of law,
visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope
for
a better
economic future.
None of
these elements can be achieved by military action alone. None are
purely
civilian.
All require an integrated civil-military partnership.”
373.
Secretary Rice
observed that compromise and politics were replacing violence
and
repression
within Iraq, but argued the Iraqi Government needed to build more
effective
international
links. She also announced that the US intended to introduce
Provincial
Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, building on the successful model that had
been
used in
Afghanistan.
374.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that, despite pressure from
Senators,
Secretary
Rice refused to give a timetable for troop withdrawal, and that the
questions
underlined
increasing scepticism that the policy was working:
“Rice
conceded to Senator Obama (Democrat) that the political and
military process
‘might not
work, but every day we have to get up and work our hardest to make
it
work. And
that everything thus far suggests that they’re trying to hold it
together.’”167
375.
On 20 October,
Mr Phillipson told Mr Blair that the referendum vote in
Ninawa
was looking
closer than expected.168
Since more
than two-thirds of voters in two other
provinces
had voted “no”, the Ninawa vote brought a real possibility of the
Constitution
being
rejected. The UN was investigating allegations of irregularities in
the province.
376.
If the
Constitution was rejected, Mr Phillipson wrote:
“… the
elections in December will be for another Transitional Government,
which will
have to
repeat the Constitution-drafting process.”
377.
Mr Blair
suggested to President Bush in their video conference on 20 October
that
if the
Constitution was rejected “we should emphasise that there was a
process and that
the Sunnis
had made their views count”.169
378.
If it passed,
“it would be important to stress the new arrangements available
for
reviewing
the Constitution after the election”.
167
eGram 16119
Washington to FCO London, 20 October 2005, ‘US: Iraq: Rice at the
Senate Foreign
Relations
Committee, 19 October 2005’.
168
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 20 October 2005, ‘VTC with President
Bush, 1335 20 October’.
169
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 20 October 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 20 October’.
552