The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

881. On 11 March, the DIS reported anecdotal evidence that Iraqi citizens were

arming themselves as protection against an anticipated breakdown in law and

order after the removal of Saddam Hussein.

882. The same report identified the Ba’ath Party as Basra’s most important

administrative institution.

883. On 11 March, the DIS produced the paper ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’.371

It was the first of a series of DIS reports on southern Iraq and came with the caveat that

much of the content was “necessarily speculative”.

884. It is not clear who saw the DIS report, but it seems likely that it would have been

sent to all those, including senior officials in the MOD and the FCO, but not DFID, who

received copies of the Red Team reports.

885. The report listed a range of possible local responses to military action, ranging

from reprisals against Ba’ath Party and Security Force personnel to the collapse of

law and order.

886. The DIS described the Ba’ath Party as “Basra’s most important administrative

institution”. The local organisation mirrored that of the rest of the country:

“Most party members will have joined for reasons of professional and social

advancement. It can be assumed most prominent members of Basra’s professional

classes (eg senior port officials, heads of local government departments, University

Heads etc.) will be party members. They may however have little role in directing the

party or ensuring regime control.”

887. The DIS stated that the “upper echelons … (Director level)” of most Basra

governorate departments, which covered the full range of local administrative functions,

would be members of the Ba’ath Party.

888. The DIS advised that there was “very limited reporting on the organisation of Iraq’s

Civil Police. And we have no information specific to Basra.” It added that there was

anecdotal evidence from elsewhere in Iraq suggesting civilians were fearful of a general

breakdown in law and order and were arming themselves. Disarming them “might be

interpreted as running contrary to cultural norms and could be resisted by the civil

populace”.

889. Those conclusions were broadly consistent with views expressed in US

intelligence briefings produced in January and March.

371 Report DIS, 11 March 2003, ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’.

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