15.1 | Civilian
personnel
“Consultancy
organisations are responsible for the well‑being and
security
arrangements
of their staff deployed to Iraq. Consultancy organisations are
strongly
advised to
follow the same rules and procedures as DFID does for its own staff
…
“The
responsibility for duty of care provisions and the security of NGO
employees
working in
Iraq is held by the NGO. DFID will offer to meet the reasonable
costs of
providing
the same level of security to NGO staff working on a DFID‑financed
project
as DFID
does for its own staff.”
326.
On 1 July
2004, officials informed the AHMGIR that the British Embassy
Baghdad
and
“Consulates” in Basra and Kirkuk had started
operating.223
Baghdad was
reported
to have
75 staff, Basra 47 and Kirkuk three.224
327.
The FCO
predicted that numbers in Baghdad would grow to “around 100 UK
staff,
of whom
over half will be consultants to Iraqi ministries and advisers on
Security Sector
Reform”.225
The British
Embassy Office Basra would consist of “around 80
UK‑based
staff, of
whom around 60 will be consultants and security sector
advisers”.
328.
Participants
at the Inquiry’s civilian outreach event told the Inquiry that
those
arriving in
mid‑2004 felt a clear disconnect between the CPA, whose staff were
shutting
up shop and
anxious to be home, and what followed. Knowledge acquired by
CPA
personnel
was not passed on and commercial rivalry between old and new
contractors
damaged
continuity.
329.
The security
situation deteriorated as the number of civilian personnel
rose.
330.
On 12 July,
Mr Simon Collis, the new Consul General in Basra, described
security
as “the
greatest immediate preoccupation”.226
He
added:
“As we
prepare to move beyond the bare essentials of an office, a secure
perimeter,
accommodation
in hardened containers and a canteen – none yet fully in place –
our
duty of
care requires that, after security, morale must be a high priority.
Access to
social
amenities is currently less than any post I have seen
…
…
“Rapid
staff turnover (the tour cycle, with breather visits, leaves only
five months
in post
before moving on) means there is a lack of institutional memory.
And as yet
there is no
cadre of experienced local staff to provide continuity
…
“We need to
take care to get the next phase of estate development right.
This
means
breaking the rush‑job habits which have, necessarily, been a
feature of the
223
Minutes, 1
July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
224
The minutes
do not distinguish between UK‑based and local staff.
225
Telegram
236 FCO London to Abidjan, 2 July 2004, ‘Iraq: New Embassy and
Embassy Offices’.
226
Telegram 77
Basra to FCO London, 12 July 2004, ‘Basra: Creating and Supporting
a New Consulate’.
301