The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

349. At their meeting on 11 September, the Chiefs of Staff noted that:

“The Gen Petraeus/Amb Crocker statement to Congress had been encouragingly

realistic but had not comprehensively articulated the future political intentions and

progress of PM Maliki.”178

350. Uncertainty remained about the direction Shia groups in Basra would take in the

coming months. As a result:

“The current nature of the UK mission in Iraq had potential to change, given the

security situation in MND(SE). It was important that the current security situation

did not cause a premature shift in strategic direction. Potential future UK missions

needed to be considered in a coalition context.”

351. Major General John Rose, MOD Director General Intelligence Collection, briefed

the Chiefs of Staff that the freeze on JAM activity was welcome but its details remained

unclear. The lack of Sadrist cohesion meant that “recalcitrant JAM members” were likely

to continue to pursue Badr, MNF-I and their opponents within JAM on an opportunist

basis, and there therefore remained a “potent threat of further violence”.

352. Iranian support to Badr/ISCI and some elements of JAM was believed to be

continuing with the goal of influencing the security strategy in southern Iraq. The Chiefs

of Staff noted that there would always be an element within JAM which would pursue

violent ends. Iranian involvement was an important factor, although the Chiefs of Staff

felt that Iran had no interest in promoting an intra-Shia struggle. The important question

that remained unanswered was “the route that the Shia groupings in Basra would follow

over the coming months: accommodation or confrontation?”

353. Government officials working closely with the military had a further meeting with

JAM1 on 11 September to discuss detainee releases and development issues.179 They

reported that the release of a further 11 detainees would take place the following day

and suggested that JAM1 and MND(SE) should:

“… be using the period of our agreement to demonstrate to both the Iraqi

government/Provincial Council and coalition development officials that there were

new opportunities … But we should be looking further than a few individual isolated

projects, towards accelerating and unblocking the projects which have already

been drawn up and approved … [JAM1] had brought a list of ideas for development

projects … [that] ranged from the relatively straightforward (street lighting, drinking

water) to the much more ambitious (building a new hospital).”

354. Following the meeting, a government official working closely with the military

reported to colleagues in London that they had been trying to assess the thinking

178 Minutes, 11 September 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

179 Email government official working closely with the military, 12 September 2007, ‘[NAME OF

OPERATION]: JAM1 Meeting 11 September’.

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