The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Assuming
that UK land participation is a requirement, there is a
judgement
to be made
on whether we should be engaged in the conflict or
post-conflict
phases. Both
would be difficult to sustain.”
465.
Lt Gen Pigott
and Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations
(CJO),
briefed the
Chiefs of Staff Committee on the options available, explaining that
“Package 4
was being
developed to address the inevitable post-conflict
tasks”.254
Adm
Boyce
commented
that it was “inconceivable that the UK would not contribute in some
manner,
to those
tasks”.
466.
The Chiefs of
Staff Committee on 19 September and subsequent
correspondence
and
discussions involving No.10 and Mr Blair are covered in more detail
in Section 6.1.
467.
Post-conflict
military operations were not addressed in Mr Watkins’ letter
of
20
September to Sir David Manning on the potential UK contribution to
military action.255
468.
Nor do they
appear in the record of the discussion between Mr Blair and Mr
Hoon
on 23
September, at which it was decided that land forces, while not
being ruled out
altogether,
should not be put forward as part of the potential UK contribution
at the
CENTCOM
planning conference later that week (see Section
6.1).256
469.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed Iraq planning on 25 September.257
They
recognised
that the
post-conflict phase of military operations (Phase IV) “would not
have a clear-cut
start” and
that the UK should “guard against any accusation that the ‘US does
the
war-fighting
while the UK does the peacekeeping’”. Not being involved in Package
3
at all
“would be difficult to manage”.
470.
The Chiefs of
Staff commissioned Lt Gen Pigott to: “Explore options for
potential
UK
involvement in Phase IV”, with a deadline of 2
October.
471.
Lt Gen Pigott
summarised the potential scale of the UK military
contribution
in Iraq in
a minute to Lt Gen Reith on 26 September.258
He
explained that aftermath
requirements
were still to be addressed and “could impact on the final shape” of
the
force
packages he was describing.
472.
The 30
September edition of the SPG paper on UK military strategic
thinking
included
more detail on post-conflict issues and is described later in this
Section.
254
Minutes, 19
September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
255
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution To Any Military Action’.
256
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the
Prime Minister:
23 September’.
257
Minutes, 25
September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
258
Minute
DCDS(C) to CJO, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential Scale of UK
Force Contribution for use
in UK/US
Contingency Planning’.
190