The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
36.
In an
Assessment on 1 November, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
judged
that Saddam
Hussein felt “little
pressure to negotiate over ...
resolution 1284 because
the
proceeds of oil smuggling and illicit trade have increased
significantly this year, and
more
countries are increasing diplomatic contacts and trade with
Iraq”.5
“Saddam
would only contemplate co‑operation with [resolution] 1284, and the
return
of
inspectors ... if it could be portrayed as a victory. He will not
agree to co‑operate
unless:
•
there is
a UN‑agreed
timetable for the lifting of sanctions. Saddam
suspects
that the US
would not agree to sanctions lift while he remained in
power;
•
he
is able to
negotiate with the UN in advance to weaken the
inspection
provisions. His
ambitions to rebuild Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction
programmes
makes him hostile to intrusive inspections or any other
constraints
likely to
be effective.
“Before
accepting 1284, Saddam will try to obtain the abolition of the
No‑Fly Zones.
He is also
likely to demand that the US should abandon its stated aim to
topple the
Iraqi
regime.”
38.
In November
2000, Mr Blair’s “preferred option” was described as
the
implementation
of 1284, enabling inspectors to return and sanctions to be
suspended.6
39.
In December
2000, the British Embassy Washington reported growing
pressure
to change
course from containment to military action to oust Saddam
Hussein,
but no decision
to change policy or to begin military planning had been taken
by
40.
The Key
Judgements of a JIC Assessment in February 2001
included:
•
There was
“broad international consensus to maintain
the arms embargo
at least as
long as Saddam remains in power. Saddam
faces no economic
pressure to
accept ...
[resolution] 1284 because
he is successfully
undermining
the economic sanctions regime.”
•
“Through
abuse of the UN Oil‑for‑Food [OFF] programme and smuggling
of
oil and
other goods” it was estimated that Saddam Hussein would
“be able
to
appropriate in
the region of $1.5bn to $1.8bn in cash and goods in
2001”,
and there
was “scope for earning even more”.
5
JIC
Assessment, 1 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co‑operation with
UNSCR 1284’.
6
Letter
Sawers to Cowper‑Coles, 27 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.
7
Letter
Barrow to Sawers, 15 December 2000, ‘Iraq’.
8