The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
92.
The letter
noted that the resolution clearly imposed joint US/UK
responsibility for
spending
the Development Fund for Iraq, and advised it was important to
ensure the
US Government
did not take action in relation to the Fund that was incompatible
with
the resolution,
explaining:
“The fact
that the resolution imposes joint responsibility gives the UK a
locus to
argue with
the US that we should be fully involved in the decision-taking
process.
Anything
less would be legally risky.”
93.
The letter
concluded by saying that resolution 1483 authorised the Coalition
to
engage in
the reconstruction and reform of Iraq to a greater degree than
would be
permissible
under the provisions of international law in relation to Occupation
alone:
“However,
it is clear that the resolution does not grant the Coalition full
legislative
and
executive authority in Iraq, so there is still a need to consider
the legality of
specific
proposals against the requirements of occupation law and the terms
of
the
resolution.”
94.
In the
Annotated Agenda for the 12 June meeting of the AHMGIR, Cabinet
Office
officials
wrote that Mr Vieira de Mello was playing an active, though
cautious, role.33
There was
general recognition that it would prove impossible at this stage to
select
candidates
for the Political Council by democratic means. The aim remained to
have a
Political
Council in place by mid-July and the Constitutional Convention
shortly after.
95.
The Annotated
Agenda also said that security in the South remained fragile.
There
was a risk
that Iraqi frustration with the pace of progress could cause the
situation to
deteriorate.
The UK’s ability to “push the pace” would be constrained by the
reduction in
UK military
force strength following transition to the 3rd (UK)
Division.
96.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the SPG’s paper on the “strategic intent and
direction”
of the UK’s
contribution to Iraq on 11 June.34
They
concluded that it was not possible to
take a
decision on the deployment of HQ ARRC until there was clarity from
the US about
future
command and control arrangements in Iraq. The UK was “currently
backward
leaning on
its deployment, pending clarification from the US”.
97.
The minutes
record that Mr William Ehrman, FCO Director General Defence
and
Intelligence,
had “urged caution in arriving at a decision” given “the imperative
for the
UK to
conduct exemplar operations in the South and the attendant risk of
a deployment
to
Baghdad”.
33 Annotated
Agenda, 12 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
34
Minutes, 11
June 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
222