The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
cost him
credibility with JAM, making additional detainee releases essential
to enable
him to
re-assert control. As well as the two “orange” detainees whose
release he had
previously
requested, he therefore asked for two “red” detainees to be
released and said
that this
was a pre-condition for the start of the month-long
cease-fire.
126.
A senior
government official reported that: “Despite this hardening of his
position
[JAM1]
maintained he was still committed to a negotiated de-escalation of
violence with
MNF-I in
Basra Province.” He wrote that all of the detainees held by MND(SE)
would
have to be
released at some point, meaning that: “Obtaining a quid pro quo for
detainee
releases
while we still have detainees to release is a factor in the
equation.”
127.
Maj Gen Shaw
told the Inquiry that in this conversation with JAM1 it was
interesting
that:
“… his
motivations entirely agreed with mine. He wanted the place to
prosper.
He was
a strong Iraqi nationalist.”57
128.
A government
official who worked closely with the military told the Inquiry
that
JAM1’s
“motivations were, of course, wholly different” from the
UK’s.58
129.
On 25 July, at
the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed AQ-I’s external
ambitions,
its
relationship with AQ core and other groups, and the threat it posed
to the UK.59
Its Key
Judgements included:
“I. The
relationship between the Pakistan-based Al Qaida (AQ) senior
leadership
(‘AQ core’)
and Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I) remains complex: AQ core can
exert
influence
but has not succeeded in controlling AQ-I. AQ core and AQ-I view
Iraq
as the
major theatre for jihad, presenting a realistic opportunity to gain
control of
ungoverned
space; their intent remains to use this space to launch terrorist
attacks
elsewhere
in the region and beyond.
“II.
Significant pressure from intensified Multi-National Force (MNF)
activity, the
success of
the Sunni tribal groups against AQ-I, the death of AQ-I leader
Zarqawi
and the
adverse publicity for AQ-I’s Amman bombing may all have helped
deter AQ-I
from
mounting the sustained campaign of external attacks envisaged by AQ
core:
it has not
launched an attack from Iraq since November 2005. AQ core now
wants
AQ-I to
concentrate firmly on Iraq as the immediate strategic
priority.”
130.
The JIC
assessed that:
“The
investigation into the attempted bomb attacks in London and Glasgow
last
month has
revealed … links between the two attackers – Bilal Abdullah and
Kafeel
Ahmed – and
known Iraq-based extremists … At this stage there are
no indications
57
Private
hearing, 21 June 2010, page 23.
58
Private
hearing [government official who worked closely with the military],
2011.
59
JIC
Assessment, 25 July 2007, ‘Al Qaida in Iraq: External
Ambitions’.
208