6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
it was
“reasonable to expect that there would be significant damage”. This
would be
greater
than if the UK had behaved like some other countries.
“… that
having valued profoundly the way we have stood shoulder-to-shoulder
with
them so
far, the US will feel betrayed by their partner of choice
…
“… the
damage to our interests and influence would be felt most
immediately
and
strongly in the foreign policy and security field, although other
areas of the
relationship
could not be immune.”
94.
The minute set
out the risks to the UK’s interests and influence, which have
not
been
declassified.
95.
Sir Kevin
concluded that:
•
military
intervention could have a “benign outcome”;
•
there would
be advantages from “being there at the outset”; and
•
being a
“key part” of the US-led Coalition would “enable us [the UK] to
continue
to act as a
force for good …”
96.
The minute was
sent only to Mr Hoon.
97.
Mr Peter
Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, suggested to Mr
Hoon that
the minute
provided thoughts “if required” for Cabinet on 16 January. He
believed that
the key
point was that a UK “betrayal” could result in “damage to our
interests globally”.25
98.
The evidence
given to the Inquiry about the context for that minute, and
the
question of
whether an earlier document from Sir Kevin Tebbit – identifying
concerns
about both
a number of aspects of the policy on Iraq and the implications of
the
proposed
change to the UK’s military contribution, and suggesting the need
for
discussion
in Cabinet – was given to Mr Hoon is addressed later in this
Section.
99.
By
mid-January, the military plan had still not been
finalised.
100.
Adm Boyce
warned of the potential dangers associated with
“catastrophic
success”
and the need to plan for Phase IV.
101.
The Chiefs
of Staff were informed that the UK might be asked to take
on
additional
tasks if they had the capacity to accept them.
102.
At the meeting
of the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January, Adm Boyce:
“…
underscored the potential dangers associated with ‘catastrophic
success’ and
the
implicit need to develop thinking for aftermath management. In
planning for
25
Manuscript
comment Watkins on Minute Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 14
January 2003,
‘Iraq: What
If?’.
401