9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
209.
The paper was
touched on only very briefly when DOP(I) met on 12
October,
as Mr Browne
indicated he would like more time to discuss and agree it formally
at a
210.
On 12 October,
the Daily
Mail published an
interview with General Sir Richard
Dannatt,
Chief of the General Staff.129
He
criticised the UK Government’s strategy for
Iraq and
called for the immediate withdrawal of UK forces from
MND(SE):
“The hope
that we might have been able to get out of Iraq in 12, 18, 24
months
after the
initial start in 2003 has proved fallacious. Now hostile elements
have
got a hold
it has made our life much more difficult in Baghdad and in Basra
…
[We should]
get ourselves out some time soon because our presence
exacerbates
the
security problems. We are in a Muslim country and Muslims’ views of
foreigners
in their
country are quite clear. ‘As a foreigner, you can be welcomed by
being
invited
into a country, but we weren’t invited, certainly by those in
Iraq at the time.
Let’s face
it, the military campaign we fought in 2003 effectively kicked the
door in.
That is a fact.’”
211.
Gen Dannatt
contrasted the situation in Iraq with the UK presence in
Afghanistan,
which he
argued was different because it was at the invitation of President
Karzai’s
government:
“‘There is
a clear distinction between our status and position in Iraq and
in
Afghanistan,
which is why I have much more optimism that we can get it
right
in Afghanistan.’”
212.
Gen Dannatt
had previously talked of the Army “running hot”, under the strain
of
fighting in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.
213.
Mr Blair,
Gen Dannatt and Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of
Staff, all refer
to this
interview, and its impact, in their memoirs. Mr Blair
commented simply that he
“wasn’t
best pleased” on hearing the news.130
“General
Dannatt’s attack on the deployment of British forces in Iraq caught
us
completely
unawares in 2006. Tony and I were engaged in delicate Northern
Ireland
negotiations
in St Andrews … We thought for a moment about sacking him
but
concluded
that that would just make him into a martyr. His comments certainly
didn’t
help our
troops in Basra; Muqtada al‑Sadr’s JAM militia leaders celebrated,
claiming
that his
comments proved that their efforts were working and that they
should
redouble
their attacks on British forces. We immediately received complaints
from
128
Minutes, 12
October 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
129
Daily
Mail, 12
October 2006, A very
honest General.
130
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
43