9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
colleagues
had “many hours of amusement” discussing with their military
colleagues
in the
preceding months how developments relating to the economy, which
had been
identified
as “the crucial thing” in helping to keep Basra stable to allow for
PIC, could
support
progress on security.
689.
Lt Gen Rollo
recorded that Prime Minister Maliki had made a strong
speech
in response
to which Governor Waili promised that Basra would be disarmed
and
corruption
rooted out.320
690.
Maj Gen Binns
observed that relations between Prime Minister Maliki
and
Governor
Waili were clearly much improved as they sat
together.321
He reported
that
Prime
Minister Maliki described 2008 as “the year of redevelopment and
reconstruction”.
691.
Maj Gen Binns
wrote that, despite the operations MND(SE) had been
conducting
on the
border in Maysan and Basra, the US chain of command appeared still
to have
concerns.
They were proposing to build forward operating bases at border
crossings
in Basra
and Maysan, and to deploy a US artillery battalion there from March
2008.
Maj Gen
Binns explained:
“I have
made the point that I believe that militarily this is not
necessary, but have
also
conceded that if MNC-I want to do this then we should be seen to
support them.
Not
surprisingly Gen Mohan and Gen Abbas are supportive of the
proposal. My chief
concern has
been the potential impact on reconciliation and Basra dynamics and
the
level of
support expected from MND(SE).”
692.
On 13
December, Mr McDonald updated the Iraq Strategy Group on
Mr Brown’s
visit to
Iraq.322
He said
that:
“Despite
some views expressed in theatre, the Prime Minister was clear that
we
should
continue on our path of Iraqiisation set out in his October
statement, which
should
entail a significant reduction in our force levels from November
2008.”
693.
SIS6 told the
Iraq Strategy Group that “influence with local leaders was likely
to
reduce in
the near future, and that might lead to a deterioration in the
security situation”.
694.
The Iraq
Strategy Group also discussed a draft FCO strategy paper for
2008-2009
and
concluded that it would not be ready for Ministers to read over
Christmas as had
been
intended.
695.
Mr McDonald
commissioned the MOD to produce a paper setting out
two
options for
force levels from November 2008: a reduction by half (to around
1,500)
or to
almost zero (a removal of UK combat forces from the South). The
paper was to
include
what tasks could be carried out, what ability there would be to
protect civilian
320
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 17 December 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (281) 16
Dec 07’.
321
Minute
Binns to CJO, 13 December 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 13
December 2007’.
322
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 14 December 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
13 December’.
309