The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
362.
On the evening
of 12 March, Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East
and
North
Africa, sent out a personal telegram to Heads of UK Missions,
informing them that:
“All
efforts from the Prime Minister downwards are focused on securing
at least nine
positive
votes for a second SCR. To help the middle ground of the Council,
we have
amended our
original draft [resolution] to include an ultimatum (currently 17
March,
with a
possibility of further softening) and are discussing some tests
designed to
show
whether Iraq is prepared to make a strategic decision to comply
fully with the
Security
Council’s demands.”117
363.
The telegram
summarised the tests and stated:
“The hope
is that these objective tests, plus a short extension of the 17
March
deadline,
might deliver positive votes from Mexico and Chile. With their
support,
plus
positive votes from Bulgaria (certain), the three Africans
(reasonably secure),
Pakistan
(not so certain) we would have the nine positive votes required
…
“The threat
of vetoes by France, Russia and perhaps even China is real.
It
remains to
be seen if they will take this step if they are convinced that nine
positive
votes are
in the bag. But Chirac has virtually committed himself to a veto in
any
circumstances,
and the Russian line is firmly against any automatic recourse
to
force. The
final denouement in New York will be before the end of the week
…”
364.
The telegram
stated that decisions on UK participation in military action
would
“depend on
the outcome in New York and a debate and vote in the House of
Commons,
likely to
be on 17 March”.
365.
Heads of
Mission were told that the telegram was for “background”; and
that:
“… in any
private conversation, even with trusted interlocutors, you should
not
speculate
but rest for the moment on the fact that we are working flat out
for a
second
resolution which reunites the Council and puts the pressure back
where
it belongs,
on Iraq.”
366.
Mr Chaplin
added that if the resolution passed “and assuming the Iraqi regime
fails
the tests
set for it (there is absolutely no sign of Saddam Hussein preparing
a U-turn),
we can
assume military action would follow quickly after the expiry of the
ultimatum”.
If the
resolution did not pass, the timetable was “much more uncertain”.
The Americans
would “not
want to delay long”. Mr Straw had decided that the UK “would
not want to
get ahead
of US travel advice” which would “squeeze the time available for UK
citizens
[in the
region] who want to get out”.
367.
Mr Chaplin
commented that Heads of Mission had been receiving “plenty
of
guidance in
the form of ministerial statements and reports from UKMIS New York
on
117
Telegram 33
FCO London to Riyadh, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal for Heads of
Mission: Iraq:
The Endgame’.
462