12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
this
Section. DCC Smith wrote that he had appointed two Deputies at the
rank of Chief
Superintendent;
one based in Baghdad, the other in Basra. The team in Baghdad
was
also
strengthened from around 10 to just under 20.
873.
The review
included a 12‑month policing strategy, which DCC Smith identified
as a
priority
for the three provinces to implement. DCC Smith wrote that it had
received wide
circulation
and consultation “with all stakeholders” and particularly with
Iraqi Chiefs of
Police. The
paper stated:
“It will
concentrate on areas that have ‘Iraqi buy in’, are achievable
within 12 months
and
importantly, sustainable (by the Iraqis) beyond 12
months.”
874.
He described
the operational implementation priorities in MND(SE) as
focusing
on two
key areas:
•
implementation
of the “12 month IPS Development Strategy and Plan”;
and
•
further
strengthening the Regional Police Training Academy at az‑Zubayr
to
enable it
to train the Iraqi trainers who would, in due course, be
responsible for
police
training.
875.
DCC Smith
stated that Gen Petraeus had taken the decision to put the 20
CPATT
International
Police Liaison Officers in MND(SE) under the command of
Maj Gen Riley,
a move
which DCC Smith described as:
“… at best
misguided and at worst a major difficulty. GOC MND(SE) now has
his
own private
US Police Advisers!! It is clear that at the senior level in
Baghdad the US
Authorities
have not been made aware that we have done things more
professionally
in MND(SE)
with senior serving CivPol Officers leading on IPS
Development.”
876.
DCC Smith
stressed the importance of extending the ArmorGroup contract,
noting
that police
officers “cannot meet the major priorities without ArmorGroup
support”. He
identified
a number of other opportunities to increase available resources,
including:
•
seeking
input from the Commonwealth and EU;
•
identifying
police officers currently serving in the Territorial Army in
MND(SE)
and
attaching them to joint military/police teams; and
•
better
recruitment of recently retired police officers, particularly from
Northern
Ireland.
877.
DCC Smith
concluded:
“We have
failed in the past through lack of appropriate succession planning
…
Substantial
effort has been put into driving UK effort forward in both Basra
and, more
recently,
Baghdad … We must not allow … poor communication with, and
within,
the UK to
diminish this drive. [The police] have many critics in Iraq in the
… military.
We must
not fail.”
255