6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

(f) what economic assistance will be available …;

(g) read-across to the MEPP.”

525. The FCO paper ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’ was sent to No.10

on 26 September.290 It was circulated separately to the AHGI.

526. The covering letter explained that FCO officials had discussed some of the issues

covered in the paper briefly with US officials earlier that day.

527. The paper, written by DSI and Research Analysts, addressed three themes:

• scenarios under which Saddam Hussein might lose power;

• the UK’s four “overarching priorities” for Iraq; and

• how those priorities might be achieved.

528. The potential scenarios listed for Saddam Hussein’s departure were: assassination

by a member of his inner circle; resignation; military coup; popular insurgency; and

externally-driven regime change.

529. The paper stated that popular uprisings were most likely “during or in the aftermath

of any military campaign”, when the situation would be most fluid and “after regular army

units had been fragmented”. Uprisings were unlikely to be successful “unless Saddam’s

military structures had collapsed and/or they received significant external assistance”.

If they did succeed, “the outcome would probably be chaos”.

530. The FCO judged that Iraq’s neighbours might find it difficult not to get sucked

in and included an explicit reference to Iran as the neighbour most likely to become

involved.

531. In the section on externally-driven regime change, the FCO reiterated that popular

uprisings were one of the possible consequences of Coalition forces entering Baghdad

and ejecting Saddam Hussein. If that happened and external rather than internal factors

were the trigger, “the Coalition should have far more influence in shaping events.

It would have large numbers of forces in many sensitive areas” and the local population

would “probably be relatively passive”.

532. The FCO stated that in each scenario, much would lie outside the UK’s control:

“In most circumstances, the decisive voice would be that of the US. But we should

be able to influence developments, through our close relationship with the US,

our diplomatic activity in the UN and elsewhere and our likely role in any military

campaign.”

290 Letter McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’

attaching Paper FCO, ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’.

201