9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
respond.
Inclinations towards inclusiveness by Shia leaders will have to be
balanced
against
wider Shia expectations of dominating the Government and
transforming
years of
repression into real power.
“III.
Without Sunni engagement in the political process, it will not be
possible
significantly
to undermine the insurgency …
“IV. The
insurgents will maintain their attempts to derail the process.
Sectarian
attacks,
especially on the Shia, and attacks on Iraqis associated with the
coalition
will
continue. The announcement of the Assembly and the Government will
give
the insurgents
a new range of targets.”
489.
The JIC also
assessed that Iran would want the new Shia-led
Government
to succeed
but would try to influence it. A perception of strong Iranian
influence or
control
over the Iraqi Transitional Government would undermine the
potential for
Sunni engagement.
490.
In early 2005,
consideration began to be given to whether the UK should seek
to
make
contact with those close to the Sunni insurgency who would “retain
a malign and
potentially
decisive influence unless squared”.263
491.
To avoid
creating distrust, Mr Asquith’s advice to Mr Straw on 17 February
was
that the
UK’s work should be undertaken with the full knowledge (though not
necessarily
explicit
agreement) of both the US and Iraqi authorities.
492.
On 22
February, the Australian Prime Minister Mr John Howard announced
that
a
450-strong Australian Muthanna Task Group would be deployed to
southern Iraq,
to “provide
a stable and secure environment for the Japanese Reconstruction
and
Support Group”
and assist in training the Iraqi Army.264
493.
Mr Blair and
President Bush met over breakfast on 22 February, during
the
President’s
visit to NATO and the EU.265
The record
of their discussion indicates that
they did
not discuss the strategy for 2005.
494.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald observed to officials across Whitehall and in diplomatic
posts:
“You will
have noticed that his [President Bush’s] formulations on Iraq, Iran
and G8 in
particular
owed a good deal to the advice he had sought from the Prime
Minister.” 266
263
Minute
Asquith to PS/PUS & PS [Secretary of State] [FCO], 17 February
2005, ‘Iraq: developing
a dialogue
with those close to the Iraqi insurgency’.
264 Australian
Government Department of Defence, Annual Report 2004-05, ‘Special
Feature –
al-Muthanna
Task Group’.
265
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 22 February 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting
with President Bush:
22
February’.
266
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 22 February 2005, ‘President Bush’s visit to
Brussels: 22 February’.
473