8 | The
invasion
Division
had a plan to take over Basra in the next few days as the regime’s
hold on the
city
disintegrated.
380.
Ms Short said
that non-governmental organisations were confused about the
duty
of the
military to provide humanitarian relief as the Occupying Power: “we
should make
plain that
this responsibility would be handed back to United Nations agencies
and
non‑governmental
organisations as rapidly as possible”.
381.
Mr Scarlett
told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 7 April that Baghdad was
not
defended in
a coherent way, but paramilitaries and some elements of the
Republican
Guard
continued to put up resistance.202
382.
Adm Boyce
informed the meeting that the isolation of Baghdad was not
yet
complete
and that reinforcement of US forces was expected shortly to enable
Coalition
Forces to
take Kirkuk and Mosul.
21/22
March: Large scale
Coalition air strikes on strategic targets including
Baghdad,
Mosul,
Tikrit and Kirkuk.203
22
March: US forces
reached Nasiriyah and secured several bridges across
the
Euphrates
River.204
The
Commander of the Iraqi 51st Division surrendered to
Coalition
Forces.
23
March: There was
steady progress north. US V Corps – the forward line of advance
–
reached 100
miles south of Baghdad, near Najaf.205
1 MEF moved
north-west out of Nasiriyah.206
24
March: Lead
elements of US V Corps were in sight of Karbala, with main
elements
consolidating
around Nasiriyah and Najaf.207
Key bridge
at Nasiriyah seized intact.208
Coalition
Forces reported to be around 280 miles
into Iraq
and advancing on Karbala and al-Kut.
By evening,
the Coalition was reported to be: “Just ahead of expected timelines
… but
weather
deteriorating.” 209
V Corps had
paused near Najaf. All southern oilfields were
under
Coalition control.
25
March: US forces
moved towards launch points for the assault on
Baghdad.210
202
Minutes, 7
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq.
203
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Overnight Sitrep –
21/22 March’.
204
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
205
Briefing
[MOD], 23 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As
at 0600Z 23 March 2003’.
206
Briefing
[MOD], 23 March 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep 23 March:
Military’.
207
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
COBR Overnight Sitrep –
23/24 March
(0715)’.
208
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Developments’.
209
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official], 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Round
Up of Key Events –
24 March’.
210
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official], 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR
Overnight Sitrep – 24/25 March’.
65