9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

planning to mobilise his supporters to sign a petition opposed to certain elements

of the TAL.”453

822. In an annex to the Annotated Agenda, the IPU recommended that, if there was

to be a resolution endorsing the new political process, then “we should take that

opportunity to also endorse the new security arrangements”.454 This would resolve the

problems of relying on resolution 1511 or an invitation from the (not fully sovereign) GC

as the basis for a continued military presence.

823. By 18 March, the GC had issued an invitation to the UN to return to help with the

structure of the interim government and preparations for elections for the Transitional

National Assembly (TNA) to be held by January 2005.455

824. On 25 March, Mr Benn told Cabinet that the next question now the TAL had

been agreed was how to organise an interim government from 1 July.456 There were

tensions within the GC about the role of the UN in that process. He observed that it

would be important to ensure that the transition to an interim government “resulted in

arrangements which looked and felt different from the preceding ones”.

825. On 31 March, the JIC assessed that insurgent attacks on Coalition Forces had

fallen from a peak in November 2003 and levelled off, but suicide attacks targeting Iraqis

had increased significantly since the turn of the year.457 Although the JIC did not know

the numbers of those involved in or supporting the violence, the occurrence of more

than 200 incidents a week was considered to suggest thousands rather than hundreds

of individuals.

826. The JIC assessed that the relative threat from different groups was difficult to

gauge; in many cases it was not possible to attribute attacks to specific groups.

827. The JIC judged:

“I. Islamist extremists … will seek to increase the level of violence in the lead up to,

and beyond, the transition of power on 30 June …

II. The level of violence is undermining Iraqi confidence in the Coalition and its

objectives.

III. Islamist extremists are finding it difficult to operate. But they will pose a

continuing and dangerous threat, particularly those associated with al-Zarqawi.

Attacks by them upon Iraqi Shia and Kurds risk stirring up inter-communal

violence. A failure by the security forces to contain the violence could lead to a

failure of the political process and a breakdown of law and order.”

453 Annotated Agenda, 18 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

454 Annotated Agenda, 18 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting attaching Paper IPU,

10 March 2004, ‘Annex A: Iraq: Transitional Arrangements for Coalition Forces’.

455 Minutes, 18 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

456 Cabinet Conclusions, 25 March 2004.

457 JIC Assessment, 31 March 2004, ‘Iraq Security: Prospects’.

341