The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
would
minimise the potential for Iraqi reversion to a WMD programme once
military
action was
complete.”
359.
The paper also
set out the elements of the US plan and addressed
whether
they were
necessary and proportionate. It concluded that the current US
Concept
of
Operations could “achieve a conventional military defeat, but that
the use of force
in
achieving this aim is potentially proportionate and
necessary”.
360.
At that stage,
Mr Hoon and MOD officials did not know Lord Goldsmith’s
views
on whether
resolution 1441 provided a legal basis for military action without
a further
authorisation
by the Security Council (see Section 5).
361.
The record of
the meeting between Lord Goldsmith, Mr Hoon and Mr Straw
stated
that Mr
Hoon had said a way of approving individual and generic targets
should be found
“beforehand”,
along with a method of handling emergent targeting needs during
the
course of
the campaign.127
362.
Lord Goldsmith
was clear that, in such an integrated campaign, it was
“practically
impossible
to make a distinction” between UK and US operations. That
significantly
increased
the legal task and reinforced the necessity for a robust audit
trail. Scrutiny
was to be
expected.
363.
Lord Goldsmith
said it would be important to tackle difficult targets early but he
was
“open to an
approach where straightforward targets could be
packaged”.
364.
Mr Hoon asked
whether it was “possible to clear easy packages early
in
order to
make a start on the large numbers of targets” which had to be
addressed.
Air
Commodore Mike Heath, Head of the Directorate of Targeting and
Information
Operations
(DTIO), outlined how full collateral considerations could not be
taken into
account
“until very shortly before the operation”.
365.
Lord Goldsmith
welcomed the broad approach outlined in the paper:
“It
correctly identified the regime as a target, but was currently too
tentative in
identifying
it as a necessary target … The conclusion at the end of the paper
that
this
campaign was “potentially proportionate” was insufficiently robust
and a more
explicit
conclusion was required.”
366.
Mr Straw asked
that more work be done to clearly identify the controlling
elements
of the
regime.
367.
Mr Blair
agreed that the overall strategy of the air campaign
was
to contribute
to the collapse of the Iraqi regime or at least prevent it
from
using WMD.
127
Letter
Williams to McDonald, 5 February 2003, ‘Potential Operations in
Iraq: Military Objectives
and
Campaign’.
440