The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
366.
The brief did
not refer to the fact that although the inspectors had found
material
that had
been procured illicitly, some of it related to permitted programmes
including
missiles
with ranges less than 150km.
367.
Mr Robin
Cook, the Foreign Secretary from May 1997 to June 2001 and
then
Leader of
the House of Commons, recorded that he had concluded Iraq did
not
have
weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons that could be
used
against
large-scale civilian targets.
368.
Mr Scarlett
reported that Mr Cook had asked a number of questions during
his
briefing on
20 February, including:
•
The “threat
posed by battlefield CBW as opposed to missiles capable of
hitting
civilian
targets (e.g. cities) in foreign countries”.
•
Iraq’s
“weaponisation capabilities”.
•
“Had
containment worked?”
•
“Had Iraq’s
WMD programmes had developed since 1998?”138
369.
Mr Scarlett
added that he had:
“… made
clear that Iraq had a range of battlefield systems capable of
delivering
CBW. We
assessed that Saddam was ready to use them, including against
his
civilian
population. Iraq might not have succeeded in developing CBW
capable
warheads
for the 150km ‘permitted’ missiles. We assessed that Iraq could
deliver
CBW with
the 650km missiles it retained; if only one of these hit home in
favourable
conditions
on an Israeli city (I might also have mentioned Kuwait), civilian
casualties
would be
large. I also made clear that Iraq’s programmes had not stood still
since
1998 and
had developed in all areas except perhaps the nuclear, where I
reminded
him of what
was in the public assessment.”
370.
Mr Cook
wrote that the briefing from Mr Scarlett had lasted an hour,
and “was
impressive
in its integrity and shorn of the political slant with which No.10
encumbers
any
intelligence assessment”.139
Mr Cook
had concluded, “Saddam probably does not
have
weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons that could be
used against
large-scale
civilian targets”.
371.
Asked if
Mr Cook had challenged the briefing, Sir John Scarlett told
the Inquiry:
“… he
questioned me very closely on the assessment … He asked for more
detail
than other
Ministers did … he was an especially experienced Minister when it
came
to the use
of intelligence. He didn’t dispute what I was saying … Where he …
took a
different
view was on how he interpreted it …”140
138
Minute
Scarlett to Powell, 18 June 2003, ‘Iraq/FAC: Robin
Cook’.
139
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
140
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 83-84.
358