6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
and
political independence would be a precondition for a UN role” and
that he “would not
wish to see
any arrangement subjugating UN activity to Coalition
activity”.
1218.
After meeting
Mr Annan, Sir Jeremy spoke to Mr John Negroponte,
US
Ambassador
to the UN, who observed that the focus within the Security Council
on
“no
legitimisation of Coalition military action” might make it
impossible to secure its
authorisation.519
Sir Jeremy
reminded him that without a resolution there would be
no IFI or
other international funding for reconstruction and it would be
“hard to drum up
troop
contributors to permit an exit strategy for US/UK
forces”.
1219.
Mr Annan
told the press:
“… the
proposal before the [Security] Council is we would want to resume
our
work as
soon as possible. And whichever authority is seen in charge at the
end
of the
hostilities, we will work with them. We don’t know what – if it is
Iraqis, if it’s
somebody
else – we will need to find a way of working, but we will be
working for
the
Security Council, in accordance with Security Council resolutions
covering the
Oil‑for-Food
…
“… I have
made it clear in my discussion with the Council and publicly, that
in times
of war, it
is the belligerents who are responsible for the welfare and safety
of the
people.
I’ve also indicated that, in any situation under occupation, it is
the Occupying
Power that
has responsibility for the welfare of the people. Without
detracting from
those
responsibilities, the UN will do whatever it can to help the Iraqi
population.”520
1220.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that Mr Annan managed the tension
within
the UN
between a Secretariat “full of resentment” that the UN had been
“bypassed” in
the
decision to go to war, and Mr Annan’s own view and that of
some others, that the
UN should
not be “absent from its responsibilities” in post-conflict
Iraq.521
Sir
Jeremy
commented
that the Secretariat was “in quite an angry mode”, but “got down to
the
planning
work in quite a responsible way”.522
1221.
Lt Gen
Reith warned the Chiefs of Staff on 21 March that there were
already
signs that
pre-conflict assumptions about the nature and duration of the
conflict
had been
wrong, with implications for Phase IV planning.
1222.
Lt Gen
Reith advised that the Coalition “must be prepared” for
high,
medium and
low levels of consent.
519
Telegram
526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN
Dynamics’.
520
UN News
Centre, 24 March 2003, Remarks by
the Secretary-General upon arrival at Headquarters
(unofficial
transcript).
521
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 8-9.
522
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 21.
527