The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
660.
When
Mr Brown and President Bush spoke on the telephone on 6
December,
Mr Brown
reported that he was looking forward to the move to PIC in Basra
on
16 December
and the UK was planning to launch the Basra Investment
Forum.302
He reported
“continued good progress” on security and economic
reconstruction
in the South.
661.
On 7 December,
government officials working closely with the military
reported
to London
on a “difficult meeting” with JAM1 the previous
day.303
662.
The officials
also reported that detainee releases were now in the gift
of
Maj Gen Binns
rather than requiring sign-off in Whitehall. The release of JAM1
was
an exception
to this rule, and was to be delegated to
Mr Prentice.
663.
FCO officials
advised Mr Miliband on 7 December that representatives of all
the
parties in
Basra signed “a statement … in which they agreed to support the
security
services in
their efforts to maintain security and work for stability and
growth in Basra”.304
Although
there had been similar declarations in the past, the FCO considered
this
statement
to be more significant because of the broad political support it
had attracted,
in
particular from OMS. FCO officials described the statement as the
work of Sayyid
Abdul Ali
al-Musawi, a prominent Shia cleric, and Sheikh Amr al-Faiz, a
tribal leader.
664.
Also on 7
December, officials in the FCO submitted advice to Mr Miliband
on the
strategy
for negotiations leading to the release of JAM1.305
MOD
officials sent a copy
of that
advice to Mr Browne, under separate cover, on the same
day.
665.
A junior
official from the FCO Iraq Group advised Mr Miliband that the
key issue
was
ensuring that the UK obtained “maximum benefit from the timing of
the release
of
[JAM1]”.306
The advice
explained that negotiations had always been based on
the
understanding that JAM1 would be released eventually, and
recommended that
Mr Miliband
should delegate the decision on the precise timing of JAM1’s
release to
Mr Prentice,
who would consult Maj Gen Binns, Mr Jones and “other
interested parties
on the
ground”.
666.
The junior
official advised that JAM1’s release could attract media
attention,
in response
to which the FCO’s message would be that “the process was part of
the
coalition’s
and GOI’s wider strategy of reconciliation with armed groups in
Iraq”.
302
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 6 December 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Call with US
President, 6 December:
Foreign
Policy’.
303
Email
government official working closely with the military, 7 December
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Meeting with [JAM1] on 6 December’.
304
Minute FCO
Iraq Group [junior official] to PS/Foreign Secretary, 7 December
2007, ‘Iraq – Basra
Developments’.
305
Minute FCO
Iraq Group [junior official] to Jenkins etc, 7 December 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION] –
negotiating
strategy’; and Minute Day to APS/SofS [MOD], 7 December 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION]’.
306
Minute FCO
Iraq Group [junior official] to Jenkins etc, 7 December 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION] –
negotiating
strategy’.
304