The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
international
community needed to give a “strong and unified message” that the
“games
had to
stop”. The UK would do all it could:
“… in the
short time that remains to make a final round of contacts to see if
there
is a way
through this impasse. But … now is the time when we have to
decide.”
694.
In response to
a question, Mr Blair added:
“So when
people say we haven’t exhausted all the diplomatic avenues, we
tried …
But … from
our perspective and from the perspective of the security of the
world, we
cannot
simply go back to the Security Council, for this discussion to be
superseded
by another
discussion. That’s what happened for 12 years …”
695.
Dr Blix
wrote that it seemed to him that there was a difference in tone
between
President
Bush and Mr Blair.239
The former
had talked about “what a bright future Iraq
would have
if Saddam was taken out”. Mr Blair had talked about “going the
last mile
for peace
and the need for the UN to stop a proliferator”. Dr Blix
wrote: “Perhaps Blair
still had
some hope that Saddam would crack … if he was faced with a
unanimous
Council resolution.”
696.
Dr Blix
recorded that Sir Jeremy Greenstock had “ventured” that the
Azores
Summit was
“about peace rather than about war”; but that the declaration
seemed to
him to be
“more belligerent than peaceful”. Dr Blix commented
that:
“… the
statement from the one-hour meeting was at this late stage perhaps
less
of an
ultimatum to Saddam than one to the members of the Security Council
– to
support the
resolution or be bypassed. The game was over … later that
Sunday
afternoon I
got the call from … Washington saying that it was time to withdraw
our
inspectors
from Iraq.”
697.
In his memoir,
President Bush described the meeting as a “last-minute summit
on
diplomatic
strategy” where they had “all agreed the diplomatic track had
reached its end.
We planned
to withdraw the second resolution Monday morning.”240
698.
President Bush
wrote:
“I was
deeply disappointed that diplomacy had failed but I had promised
the
American
people, our allies and the world that we would enforce the UN
resolutions.
I was not
going to break my word.
“For months
I had solicited advice … Some believed we could contain Iraq
by
keeping the
inspectors in Iraq. But I didn’t see how. If we were to tell Saddam
he
had another
chance – after declaring this was his last chance – we would
shatter
our credibility
and embolden him.
239
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc,
2005.
240
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
522